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Foreword
I commend Bright Blue for producing a timely and compelling report 
that makes a powerful case for reforming the country’s failing residential 
property taxes and proposes realistic ways of moving forward. 
This Government has made the political choice to stand on a platform 
of levelling up. This policy position has garnered this Government 
an 80-seat majority with its core mandate about improving the lives 
of those who have been left behind in some of the most deprived 
areas of the country. We can only hope that the Government will feel 
empowered to take advantage of this extraordinary mandate for the 
benefit of the nation as a whole.
Yet, because of the pandemic, only a fraction of the work of levelling 
up has been achieved, leaving many areas in the same position that they 
have been for a generation. 
In a bid to boost deprived areas of the country the Government has 
focused on investment in infrastructure, towns funds and freeports. 
While these measures are useful in the long run, people living in these 
areas are still having to pay for a tax that disadvantages them for living 
in lower value homes. To make a meaningful impact, tax reforms that 
translate to more money in the pockets of these communities are needed.
Bright Blue’s excellent paper makes the critical point that it is politics, 
and not economics, that will determine the future of the UK’s property 
taxes. These political choices have critical economic consequences 




For the Government to truly achieve its mission, it must make 
political choices which have the desired impact of improving the lives 
of households that are most in need of levelling up on a timescale that 
resonates with voters. 
Council Tax and Stamp Duty reform is one such area where the 
Government should seize the mantle of levelling up. Our view is that 
households are already paying sufficient property taxes – the problem 
is that the wrong households are paying the wrong taxes at the wrong 
times. Removing both taxes would have multiple benefits: it takes 
away the regressive banding system; it removes the arbitrary impact 
that house price growth over the last 30 years has had on people’s tax 
burden; and lifts the economic handbrake that is stamp duty. It offers 
both a path to greater economic growth and a better distribution of the 
resulting income than our current system can provide. 
Reform would improve living standards, and go some way towards 
ensuring that the whole UK can benefit from the same access 
to opportunities. It is exciting to see the authors advocating the 
introduction of a proportional property tax. Such a policy would be 
simpler, economically efficient and aligned with Government’s goals. 
It would also provide greater fiscal flexibility and would benefit a large 
majority of households across the UK, helping to meet the Government’s 
levelling up targets. 
As the paper makes clear there is no technical reason for delay. 
Valuation of property is “an easy and cheap task so long as it does not 
rely on traditional valuation techniques but uses statistical methods” 
a revaluation with no additional structural change to property tax is 
rightly dismissed as failing insufficient to the scale of the challenge. 
Bright Blue’s paper also makes useful and noteworthy interventions 
around green deductions and tax-free thresholds which are useful 
additions to the debate and ones which we encourage the Government 
to consider fully. 
Yet, where we stand currently, the first great hurdle is for the 
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Government to consider property tax reform at the highest levels. The 
political cost of inaction is simply too high now for the issue to be ignored. 
If the Government really is serious about levelling-up, as the recent 
appointment of a Levelling Up Adviser suggests, then property tax 
reform is exactly the kind of “bold new policy intervention” that could 
really make “meaningful change” in people’s lives.1
I very much hope that the Government gives this excellent paper 
the attention it deserves. Local government, economists, think tanks, 
tax reformers and third sector organisations are ready to support the 
principles of this initiative. Are ministers and Her Majesty’s Treasury 
willing to do the same?
Andrew Dixon 
Founder & Chairman




Property taxes are some of the oldest taxes in the world. They were, 
after all, the point of the Domesday Book. Their advantage has always 
been that property has a fixed location and taxes on it are simple to 
collect and difficult to avoid.
The main property taxes in England now, however, are a fudge: taxes 
both on houses and on people. This is the result of the Poll Tax fiasco 
and its aftermath in the late Thatcher period, requiring a quick fix 
which gave us Council Tax (CT) in 1993. To this was added a tax on 
transactions, the Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT). 
There are also specific taxes on new construction: Section 106 (S106) 
Agreements, the result of one-off negotiations paid in kind for granting 
planning permission; and, the Community Infrastructure levy (CIL) 
raised as a tax per m2 on built space but only charged by some Local 
Authorities (LA) with no policing of how proceeds are spent.
Since at least the 1950s, there has been a growing realisation that 
property taxes in England are in dire need of reform. All the current 
main property taxes have major defects rendering the system not fit for 
purpose. Assessments for CT are frozen at 1991 values and are highly 
regressive. Since the top value is still £320,000, the single occupant of 
a house worth £2.5 million in a London street may pay less than their 
married neighbours with a child in a one-bedroom flat next door. SDLT is 
a tax on moving, so means that people are less likely to downsize and it is 
more difficult to find houses to suit them as family circumstances change.
Executive summary
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There are two further aspects of the system to take into account: 
first, the incentives it provides for local communities to permit new 
building – at present they must pay for service but get very little 
revenue which understandably fuels ‘NIMBYism’ and, second, the 
financial independence of local government. CT revenues provide only 
a small portion of LA revenues, most of which are in the form of central 
government grants. These result in a ‘claw-back’ of any additional 
revenues LAs might raise. The present system has converted local 
governments into little more than agencies of national government 
except in one respect: control of the planning system.
In this paper, we review, critically evaluate and make recommendations 
for the replacement of the current main taxes on residential property.
The focus is on the property taxation system for England, but the 
analysis and our ideas could be extended to Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. 
We evaluate options for reform against a number of economic and 
political criteria. Economic criteria include: revenue raising; efficiency; 
equity; simplicity; incentives for building housing; and, automatic 
stabilisation. Political criteria include: public acceptability; ease of 
transition; and, alignment with key government objectives.
In coming to a final recommendation for replacing the main current 
property taxes, we were conscious that the best should not be the 
enemy of the good. There is widespread consensus that reform is badly 
needed: the problem is not so much thinking of better alternatives to 
the status quo but of agreeing which alternative. We have therefore 
given particular attention to the following criteria: simplicity, public 
acceptability and ease of transition.
The main replacements we consider are a proportionate tax on the 
value of houses or on the value of ‘unimproved land’ (the value of land 
assuming no obstacles to changing its use in the most profitable way): 
in both cases, with and without a tax exemption. We then include 
supplementary taxes or subsidies to these two principal options: a 
‘green offset’, automatically adjusting how much tax was paid according 
12
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to the energy efficiency of the house; and, a ‘Development Levy’, paid 
at a standard rate to LAs with the revenues required to be spent on 
additional infrastructure and services to pay the costs generated by 
additional residents and on social housing.
In conclusion, the combination of policies we recommend as the 
main property taxes in England are:
1. An Annual Proportional Property Tax (APPT) on the current 
capital value of houses to replace both CT and SDLT, which are 
phased out while the APPT is phased in. 
2. The national government(s) and LAs to impose separate APPT 
tax rates. The national tax rate(s) should be set to replace the 
shortfalls from phasing out SDLT. We estimate the rate required 
to achieve this would be 0.11% for primary homes and 0.14% for 
second homes (25% surcharge). LAs should be entirely free to set 
their own tax rates, with no claw back by the central government. 
LAs should be free to spend this revenue on the mix of local 
services their residents want. There should consequently be a clear 
distinction between those services for which there are nationally 
set standards (such as education, health care and social services) 
to be funded by national governments with LAs the agents 
for delivery; and those services which are locally determined 
(examples would be parks, local transport or cultural services).
3. A tax exemption on the APPT for houses worth less than £50,000. 
This makes the option slightly more equitable but is set at a level 
where the impact on net tax revenue and neutrality is negligible.
4. Houses to be revalued annually using statistical techniques but 
applying the tax to a three-year moving average of value with a 
clearly designed appeal process under the auspices of the existing 
government professional services (District Valuer Services). There 
should be provision for those faced with very large increases in tax 
liability (for example if the value of it doubles) to defer property 
tax payments until sale or inheritance. 
Executive summary
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5. Green offsets applied to the APPT to improve energy efficiency. 
The offsets can be designed in a revenue neutral fashion with 
a tax for energy inefficient buildings but a subsidy for energy 
efficient ones.
6. A Development Levy set at 20% of the realised market price of 
newly constructed houses. This is to replace the current Section 
106 Agreements and CIL, and proposed Infrastructure Levy from 
the current Government. 
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Chapter 1: Taxes on property
Reviewing the literature on forms of taxation on residential 
property around the world suggests they can be broken down into 
four distinct types. 
i)  Taxes on the value of buildings. Council Tax (CT), as explained 
in detail below, is the British example. Local property taxes are 
popular in numerous other countries, including the USA.
ii)  Taxes on the value of land. This is a tax long favoured by 
economists, going back to Adam Smith although most famously 
associated with the 19th century economist Henry George.2 It 
has recently been advocated, or at least positively reviewed, by 
the New Zealand Productivity Commission3, the attorney and 
tax scholar Joan Youngman4, and the applied economist John 
Muellbauer.5
iii)  Taxes on the value of transactions. Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT), 
as explained in detail below, is the English example. Transaction 
taxes are widespread across Europe and the world.
iv)  Taxes on increase in value. This is capital gains, which is not 
2. Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An inquiry into the cause of industrial depressions and of 
increase of want with increase of wealth: the remedy (New York: D. Appleton & Co, 1879).
3. New Zealand Productivity Commission, “Using land for housing”, www.productivity.govt.nz/
inquiries/using-land-for-housing/ (2015).
4. Joan Youngman, A good tax, (Cambs., MA: Lincoln Institute, 2016).
5. John Muellbauer, “Housing, debt and the economy: a tale of two countries”, N.I. Economic Review (2018).
Taxes on property
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exclusive to property. In Britain, as in many countries such as 
New Zealand or Canada, housing receives special treatment: a 
person’s primary residence is exempt from taxes on capital gains, 
favouring a life cycle approach to saving in the form of housing as 
an asset class. In the UK, Capital Gains Tax (CGT) is essentially 
paid only on second homes or buy-to-let properties. There are tax 
free thresholds but for houses that qualify, such as second homes, 
the rate charged on such properties is higher than on capital gains 
on other financial assets. The capital gains tax relief on first homes 
generates an incentive to divert assets into housing. It also favours 
owner-occupiers vis-à-vis landlords and renters.
There are, in addition, a range of other taxes (or subsidies) affecting 
residential property.
i) Levies on government induced land value uplift. This is currently 
‘taxed’ in two main ways in England: Section 106 Agreements 
(S106), which are essentially negotiated payments in kind, and the 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), both of which are discussed 
in detail later. Both these, and their Scottish equivalents, are unique to 
Britain reflecting the particular discretionary form of British land use 
regulation and the scarcity value this generates for development land.
ii) Differential treatment of second homes. In England, there is 
differential treatment of second homes for both SDLT and Council Tax. 
In some countries, such as the US (New York), Canada (Vancouver), 
France, Israel and Singapore, there is a specific tax on second homes or 
on foreign purchase of homes.6
iii) Taxes on or subsidies for energy inefficient buildings. In the UK, 
there have been subsidies (negative taxes) for energy efficiency 
in buildings such as the ‘Green Deal’ or, more recently, the just 
6. Christian Hilber and Olivier Schöni, “On the economic impacts of constraining second home 
investments”, Journal of Urban Economics (2020).
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abolished ‘Green Homes Grant’ for retrofitting homes. Systematic 
taxes on energy inefficiency have been proposed by, for example, 
Muellbauer because of a market failure with respect to energy use 
and its impact on climate.7
iv) Taxation on rental income. If two people rent out houses they 
own to each other, both will pay tax on the rents they receive 
but if they live in their own houses, no tax is paid. Until 1963, 
owner-occupiers were liable to pay income tax on the value of the 
imputed rents they enjoyed. This is still the case in, for example, 
Switzerland.
v) Tax deductibility of mortgage interest. Until April 2000, interest 
paid on mortgages in the UK up to a limit which varied over time 
was deductible for purposes of income tax. Such tax deductibility 
of mortgage interest still applies in many regions and countries 
although some, such as the regions of Flanders and Brussels in 
Belgium, The Netherlands and the USA, have been significantly 
reducing its scope. 
There is a useful distinction between taxes affecting the stock of 
property, such as CT, and those on the margin. Examples of the latter 
are SDLT, paid only when property is transacted, or S106 or CIL, paid 
only on newly constructed houses. 
This distinction is relevant for at least two reasons. First, the 
acceptability of a tax may increase if it is viewed as ‘voluntary’. One 
does not have to pay SDLT if one does not sell or buy a house, whereas 
CT is very difficult to avoid. In addition, a tax or levy on only new 
buildings – depending what group receives the revenues and how the 
revenues are spent – will affect the incentive for local communities to 
accept new development.
A 2014 OECD report by Richard Almy provides a useful survey of 
practice as it varies around the world in the taxation of ‘immovable 
7. Muellbauer, “Housing, debt and the economy”
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property’ (real property or real estate).8 Table 1.1 below is taken from 
this. It is immediately apparent that there is a wide range of international 
practice across OECD countries.
Table 1.1. Taxation of immovable property in OECD countries
A land tax only: Estonia
A tax on land and buildings (a 
single immovable property tax): 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, 
India, Indonesia, South Africa
A land tax plus an immovable 
property tax:
Australia, New Zealand, Poland, Slovak Republic, Brazil 
A building tax plus an immovable 
property tax:
Greece, Ireland, United Kingdom
A land tax, a building tax, and an 
immovable property tax:
Denmark, France, Slovenia, China, Russian Federation
A separate land tax and a 
separate building tax:
Hungary
The most common system seems to be a tax on the combined capital 
value of land and the current buildings on the land. Some countries – 
such as France – have separate taxes on buildings and on land. Then 
there are also countries like Denmark with separate taxes on land, 
residential buildings and commercial buildings. 




Box 1.1. The case of Denmark 
The Danish experience illustrates the complex palimpsest of taxes 
and methods that have developed over time. There are three types 
of property taxes: a land tax on all types of land, a service tax on 
the value of buildings used for business or administration, and a 
property value tax on residential property. 
The Danish land tax (grundskyld) is an annual tax on the assessed 
value of land and is part of the municipal property tax. The land 
tax rate was between 1.6% and 3.4% of the assessed land value in 
2019.9 The service tax on the value of buildings used for business 
or administration cannot exceed 1% of the assessed value of the 
building. The annual rate of the property value tax on the owner-
occupied dwellings in 2019 was 1% (3% above a threshold of about 
EUR 400K) of the assessed value of a dwelling. 
The UK has separate taxes on residential buildings (plus the land 
on which they stand by implication) based on pseudo capital values10; 
and on rental values of commercial building space – which again, 
by implication, reflect some value of the land on which the building 
stands. In the next section, we explore the specific features of residential 
property taxation in England.
The current English system of residential property 
taxation 
There are two main taxes on residential property in England: CT and 
SDLT. SDLT in England yielded some £11,250 million in 2019-20 
9. Agricultural land is taxed as well, but at lower rates (below 0.7%).
10. ‘Pseudo’ because the values used to assess property for CT bear no relation to current capital 
values but to values assessed in 1991 or, for buildings constructed in the past 30 years, what their 
values might have been in 1991. This is discussed in more detail in the context of Table 1.2 below.
Taxes on property
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compared to £31,600 million from CT. In addition, there is the CIL 
and S106 Agreements.11 A 2018 study for the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), claimed the total 
value of CIL receipts and Section 106 Agreements was some £6,000 
million in 2016-17.12
We discuss all these ‘taxes’ (S106 agreements can be interpreted as a 
tax in kind) and their defects below.13
Council Tax (CT)
Box 1.2. The evolution of CT
‘Domestic Rates’, levied on property and originally introduced 
in 1601 to fund provisions of the Poor Law, were historically 
local governments’ prime source of revenue. But locally raised 
revenue, which was 75% of the total in 1930, fell to about 62% 
in 1970 and just over 50% in 1980 as central government grants 
along with central government control played a larger and 
larger part.14
A combination of rapidly increasing statutory obligations and 
rising wages created ever increasing pressures on local revenues. 
11. There is also Capital Gains Tax, which is less important and more difficult to quantify than 
the main two. In fact, it is probably less important than S106 Agreements, although the total cost 
of those and the value they generate is impossible accurately to estimate and the hidden costs are 
likely high. See Paul Cheshire, “Broken market or broken policy? The unintended consequences of 
restrictive planning”, National Institute Economic Review (2018), R9-19.
12. MHCLG, “The incidence, value and delivery of planning obligations and community infrastructure 
levy in England in 2016-17”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/685301/Section_106_and_CIL_research_report.pdf (2018).
13. There are other subsidiary and perhaps temporary taxes or subsidies on housing or specific categories 
of housing or buyers. An example is the Help to Buy equity loan scheme, a subsidy explicitly on purchases 
of new build homes and since 2021 exclusive to first time buyers. However, as research has shown this is a 
very dubious policy and at least where housing is in short supply – most areas where people are wanting 
to buy homes – more a subsidy on the developers who have specialised in building homes that attract first 
time buyers than on the first time buyers themselves (see Carozzi et al., 2020).





Despite rising grant income,15 following domestic rate revaluation 
in 1973 (postponed since 1968), in 1974 alone the average increase 
in domestic rates was 30%.16 Although this should be set against 
the then rate of inflation of 16% a year, still the outcry shows how 
sensitive public opinion is to changes in property taxes. This gave 
rise to serious political pressure for reform. A Royal Commission 
chaired by Sir Frank Layfield was set up as a response with a brief to 
review the whole system. This reported in 1976.
The Layfield Commission favoured a system of local government 
finance that remained decentralised but had new and substantially 
enlarged financial resources available to it. But no local tax reform 
ensued.17 As a holding measure, the post-1979 Conservative 
Government published a Green Paper in 1981. This looked at 
alternatives to the domestic rates, including a local income tax, a 
local sales tax and a poll tax. But once again, no reform occurred. 
A second consultative paper, published in 1986, proposed the 
introduction of a poll tax as a replacement for domestic rates.18 
This was euphemistically re-named the Community Charge and 
introduced in Scotland in 1989 and in England and Wales a year later. 
Whether named the Community Charge or Poll Tax, the policy 
created serious opposition, the tip of the iceberg being the ‘Poll 
Tax riots’ of 1990. The new Conservative Government led by John 
Major abolished the Community Charge and cobbled together 
what was in essence a new variation of the Domestic Rates, the 
15. In terms of revenues to finance services provided by LAs, grants from central government 
have grown very substantially since the Second World War. In some recent years these grants have 
provided 80 % of LA revenues. It is changes to these, designed in principle to ensure LAs have the 
necessary revenues to deliver a common quality of services such as education across the country, 
that means there tends to be a process of ‘revenue equalisation’: if an LA gets more revenue from 
local taxes on say property it is liable to lose government grants over the following period.
16. Parliament, “Select Committee on Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: housing, planning, 
local government and the regions- ninth report”, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/
cmselect/cmodpm/402/40202.htm (2004).
17. For some further detail see Parliament, “housing, planning, local government and the regions”
18. Parliament, “Housing, planning, local government and the regions”
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Council Tax (CT), introduced by the Local Government Finance 
Act in March 1992, coming into effect the following year.19 
The CT was rushed through to resolve a political emergency. It 
combines a tax on domestic property (Business Rates are a separate 
and national tax) and a quasi-fixed tax on people: properties with 
only a single occupant pay only 75% of the tax and empty properties 
only 50%.20 This was to reflect its ostensible function as a charge for 
services provided by local authorities. 
Massive and differential house price inflation across property types 
and locations over the past 30 years, when CT was first introduced, 
means that CT liabilities now bear only a tenuous relationship to 
market values. The result is highly regressive as well as arbitrary.
CT is levied as a crudely estimated proportion of the value of houses 
with the liability to pay resting with the occupier. The rate paid is poorly 
correlated with the current value of houses and moreover is designed to 
reflect not just property prices but the number of people living in the 
houses so consuming services.
The bands for Council Tax are listed below in Table 1.2. These bands 
remain the same as when CT was established in 1991.
Table 1.2. Council Tax bands for 2020-21
Band Property value range
A Up to and Inc. £40,000
B £40,001 – £52,000
C £52,001 – £68,000
19. GOV.UK, “Local Government Finance Act 1992”, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/14/
section/93.
20. GOV.UK, “Council Tax: Who has to pay”, https://www.gov.uk/council-tax/who-has-to-pay.
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D £68,001 – £88,000
E £88,001 – £120,000
F £120,001 – £160,000
G £160,001 – £320,000
H Over £320,000
Using a complex formula, centred on the yield from Band D 
properties, LAs apply a ‘rate’ – a fraction of the assessed value calculated 
to yield the total revenue required – to be paid in tax. LAs can set their 
own rates subject to the limits set from time to time by the central 
government. All resulting revenues are collected by the LA but, where 
legally provided for, a proportion is transferred as a ‘precept’ to a higher 
authority or an authority with specialised functions (such as drainage 
or flood prevention). 
The CT has several serious deficiencies. The most recent valuation was 
done – in haste – in April 1991. Newly built houses are retrospectively 
assessed to the same date. A revaluation was planned for 2007, but this 
was postponed and then cancelled. For the purposes of CT, properties 
are still valued on a 1991 basis. 
Since 1991 not only have house prices – abstracting from inflation – 
more than doubled, but the rate of increase has varied sharply by regions, 
even neighbourhoods. In a number of London boroughs, the median 
price of a detached house increased more than eightfold between 1995 
and 2020; in some southern English towns, such as Brighton, by more 
than six times. But in towns in the North West, such as Burnley or 
Blackpool, the comparable increase was around 2.7 times.21
In 1995, the median price of a detached house in Camden already 
exceeded the cut-off of £320,000. The implication is that although by 





June 2020, that house cost £3,650,000, for the purposes of CT, it cost the 
same. This illustrates why CT is so regressive: the more valuable your 
house, the less likely it is that your CT will have increased since 1991. 
The highest rates of tax are paid on the cheapest houses. There are even 
discounts of 50% for second homes.
Although it is generally accepted that CT is regressive across 
individuals, it is still surprising that per capita receipts from CT were 
highest not in London but the South East (£643) and in fact lowest in 
London (£481) followed by the West Midlands (£483), thus reinforcing 
rather than alleviating regional disparities. This is because London’s 
boroughs impose lower rates for given tax bands compared to councils 
in other regions.
While there are discounts for second homes and for people in single 
occupation (generating an additional incentive for using available 
housing space inefficiently) there are no discounts for energy efficient 
houses. Several charges are levied on more polluting cars, for example 
higher costs of residents’ parking permits, so the principle of taxing 
pollution is established, even for LAs. There is an elaborate system of 
energy efficiency certification for houses, through Energy Performance 
Certificates (EPCs). So it would be simple to scale taxes on houses to 
reflect their energy efficiency. CT does not do that.
A final feature of CT is that – since it was designed as a hurried 
replacement for the Community Charge – it retains an element of being 
a charge on residents for the provision of local public services. So it 
is levied on occupants not owners. One can debate whether this is a 
theoretical defect of the tax. In terms of distributional effects, it might 
appear to be adding to its regressiveness. But since Council Tax liability 
can be expected to be largely reflected in rents paid, the practical effect 
on income distribution is not likely to be great.
Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT)
The other main tax on housing in England is Stamp Duty Land 
Tax (SDLT), first introduced in 1694, which is paid by the buyers 
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when a transaction occurs. There are comparable taxes on property 
transactions in Wales and Scotland.
The rules and rates of the SDLT have changed over time. Particularly 
since 2010, the rates have increased and a range of complex exemptions 
(for first time buyers, for example) and higher rates for second homes 
have been introduced. 
A reform in 2014 eliminated ‘bunching’ of transactions at the various 
tax rate thresholds. This has been achieved by making tax rates only 
payable on the portion of the property value which falls within each 
band. 
This also affected how multiple dwellings relief (MDR) is calculated. 
In a similar vein, an annual tax on enveloped dwellings (ATED) and 
a 15% higher rate applied to corporate and ‘non-natural’ purchasers 
were introduced to deter the practice of buying and owning residential 
property within a corporate wrapper (referred to as ‘enveloping’).
In 2016 a higher rate for additional dwellings (HRAD) was 
introduced. This is an additional surcharge of 3% above the standard 
SDLT for purchases of residential property, when the buyer owns more 
than one property. 
From November 2017, there were lower effective rates for first time 
buyers – for them the exemption threshold was £300,000 – and higher 
rates on the purchase of additional homes.
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic a tax holiday for SDLT was 
introduced in July 2020.22 The original holiday raised the exemption 
limit from £125,000 to £500,000. The holiday was set to expire on 31 
March 2021 but was extended to 30th June in the 2021 Budget, and will 
be gradually phased out by lowering the exemption limit to £250,000 
until the end of September 2021. First-time buyers will continue to be 
22. The SDLT has been subjected to numerous tax ‘holidays’. Tax holidays are used to stimulate the 
economy during downturns. Recent examples include the Great Financial Crisis (holiday period: 
9/2008-12/2009) or COVID-19 (7/2020-3/2021). While such stimuli have the potential to stabilise 
the economy, getting the timing right is problematic as the ongoing crisis illustrates: there is a 
real risk that the end of the holiday may coincide with the end of the furlough scheme, potentially 
triggering a rise in unemployment and a downward shock to the housing market.
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exempt up to the threshold of £300,000 and a reduced rate will apply for 
dwellings valued between £300,000 and £500,000.
The rates in Table 1.3 below are those that applied prior to the tax 
‘holiday’.
Table 1.3. Stamp Duty rates for all buyers other than first-time buyers, 
pre-8th July 2020
Property value SDLT rate
Up to £125,000 Zero
The next £125,000 (the portion from £125,001 to £250,000) 2%
The next £675,000 (the portion from £250,001 to £925,000) 5%
The next £575,000 (the portion from £925,001 to £1.5 million) 10%
The remaining amount (the portion above £1.5 million) 12%
Note: Since 22 November 2017, first time buyers paying £300,000 or less for a residential property pay no SDLT. 
After the SDLT holiday ends, first time buyers will be exempt again up to a value of £300,000 and a reduced rate 
will apply for dwellings valued up to £500,000. 
SDLT is progressive: although it reduces sales, when they occur rates 
rise with sales prices, at least, to £1.5 million. Consistent with this, at 
regional level – using data for 2018-19 – per capita revenue from SDLT 
was highest in London (£512) and lowest in the North East (£62). 
While the reform of 2014 has been a step in the right direction, it 
neither eliminated nor materially altered the much more fundamental 
flaw of the tax – the fact that it “creates a disincentive for people to move 
house”, causing a mismatch in the housing market and inflexibilities in 
the labour market.23
Evidence for the SDLT, and taxes on the value of transactions in 
numerous other countries, strongly confirm the adverse effects on 
23. James Mirrlees, Stuart Adam, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Stephen Bond, Robert Chote, 




household mobility. The economists Michael Best and Henrik Kleven 
estimate that a temporary elimination of a 1% SDLT increased housing 
market activity by 20%.24 Estimates from a 2017 study by Christian Hilber 
and Teemu Lyytikäinen imply that a two percentage-point increase in 
the SDLT reduces mobility by 37%.25 The same authors also show that 
the main adverse effects of the SDLT is on housing-related mobility 
and short-distance moves. Put differently, the SDLT discourages older 
residents from downsizing and prevents growing families from moving 
to bigger houses or more child-friendly neighbourhoods or areas with 
better schools, thus creating mismatch in the housing market and 
inefficient use of living space. 
The estimated welfare loss to society is massive. Hilber and 
Lyytikäinen estimate it to be 84% of the additional revenue generated 
by the tax.26 This strongly suggests that abolishing or phasing out SDLT 
and replacing it with another tax that is associated with less ‘deadweight 
loss’ has the potential not only to increase efficiency in the housing 
market but also to significantly improve economic output and public 
finances in the longer run.
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and Section 106 (S106) 
Agreements
There are two other taxes, or effective taxes, specific to property that, 
like SDLT, also apply only on the ‘margin’, but in these cases on the 
value uplift conferred on land when planning permission is granted. 
Most of this value uplift is itself generated by the restrictiveness of the 
UK planning system and the constriction this imposes on the supply of 
24. Michael Carlos Best and Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, “Housing market responses to transaction 
taxes: evidence from notches and stimulus in the U.K.”, Review of Economic Studies (2018), 157-193.
25. Christian Hilber and Teemu Lyytikäinen, “Transfer taxes and household mobility: distortion on 





In the UK, they go back to a legal case of 1427, when the Crown 
demanded compensation from property owners, whose land had 
become more valuable because of flood prevention and drainage 
works.28 This led to a legal concept of ‘Betterment’ and attempts to tax 
it.29 Originally seen as a result of physical improvements paid for by 
public authorities, since 1947 the focus has shifted to increases in the 
price of land as a result of development permission being granted.
The first of these is the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). LAs 
can choose whether to charge this or not. At the end of 2016-17, only 
133 out of a possible 339 LAs (39%) were charging CIL. It is, therefore, 
an inefficient tax in terms of revenue raising. 
LAs set their own rates and many have multiple rates determined by 
the location of the proposed development or its purpose, even form. 
In these cases, CIL is being de facto used as an additional instrument 
of development control as when, for example, rates are deliberately set 
so high on student housing as to eliminate it from the LA. CIL is a 
charge per square metre on the new development so is non-neutral: 
it penalises more spacious structures on a given site. Like other taxes 
on property, it is largely – probably entirely – capitalised into the price 
paid for development land. The proceeds from CIL are supposed – as 
its name implies – to be spent on infrastructure needed to support new 
development. However, this is not enforced so the revenues from CIL 
may largely disappear into LA general funds. 
Next, Section 106 (S106) Agreements30 are the outcome of negotiations 
between local planning authorities and developers whereby a condition 
27. Paul Cheshire and Stephen Sheppard, “Welfare economics of land use regulation”, Journal of 
Urban Economics (2002), 242-69; Paul Cheshire and Stephen Sheppard, “The introduction of price 
signals into land use planning decision-making: a proposal”, Urban Studies (2005), 647-63; Christian 
Hilber and Wouter Vermeulen, “The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England”, 
Economic Journal (2016), 358-405.
28. Keith Davies, Law of compulsory purchase and compensation (London: Butterworths, 1984).
29. Paul Cheshire, Max Nathan and Henry G. Overman, Urban economics and urban policy: 
challenging conventional policy wisdom (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), ch. 6.




of granting planning permission is that the developer provides some 
community assets, usually in the form of ‘affordable housing’. S106 
Agreements are sometimes called ‘planning obligations’. They are a 
form of tax, but a tax-in-kind. 
A substantial proportion of LAs – more than half in 2010 – had never 
negotiated S106 Agreements and for roughly half of the 326 LAs for 
which there are data, the number of S106 properties built per annum 
between 2015 and 2018 was less than 20 units. 
As mentioned above, a study for MHCLG claimed the total value 
of CIL receipts and Section 106 Agreements was some £6,000 million 
in 2016-17, but there were significant sampling problems likely to 
have generated an upward bias to this estimate.31 Since the LAs which 
answered the survey were self-selected, they were likely to have been 
biased in favour of those LAs who were active in pursuit of S106 
agreements.
Furthermore, no ‘negative value’ was included for the transaction 
costs involved in the elaborate negotiation of S106 Agreements, the 
additional risk injected into the development process, or the resulting 
foregone construction, which in turn adversely affects the affordability 
of non-subsidised housing via limiting supply. In fact, S106 Agreements 
seem like an extremely inefficient and counterproductive way to 
provide local public goods.
The Government’s recent White Paper Planning for the future 
therefore proposes abolishing S106 Agreements and CIL with a new 
Infrastructure Levy, as explained later.32
31. MHCLG, “The incidence, value and delivery of planning obligations”.
32. MHCLG, “Planning for the future”, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/planning-for-
the-future (2020).
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Chapter 2:  Criteria for changing the 
English residential property  
tax system
That a pair of taxes introduced in recognisably their current form in 
1601 (Rates, or CT), and 1694 (SDLT), should be in desperate need 
of reform is hardly controversial. Nor is it novel. The problem is not 
so much analysing why these main two property taxes are seriously 
flawed but in agreeing more efficient, equitable and politically 
acceptable replacements. More precisely, since many alternatives 
combining these features have been proposed, the problem is 
narrowing down options to focus the basis of real reform while 
acknowledging the implications any reform has for the independence 
of local government from central control. 
Structural reform is vital, but unfortunately never quite urgent 
enough to get full-on attention. Furthermore, as the neglected Layfield 
Committee’s report acknowledged, taxes on housing do not exist in a 
separate policy or fiscal compartment. The Layfield Committee was 
focused on the questions of centralised government control of local 
decisions as in say Greece or Ireland compared to very decentralised 
systems such as in the USA or Switzerland. Devolved power requires 
devolved sources of revenue. Taxes on property historically have 
provided that, since they are place-specific and paid by residents. They 
are, in addition, very difficult to avoid: CT is more effectively collected 
than any other tax in the UK.
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Recent analysis has shown how important the degree to which 
revenues revert to LAs (which have responsibility for both planning 
decisions and providing services to residents, including the new 
residents who come with new houses), is as an influence on how 
restrictive LAs are with respect to development control.33 In turn, 
that degree of restrictiveness applied to development control largely 
determines the long run supply of housing in a community. 
Another issue is the overall impact property taxes may have on the 
distribution of disposable incomes and, since property is so tightly tied 
to place, the spatial distribution of incomes. But in the wider policy 
context, ensuring a particular tax is or is not progressive, is not very 
relevant: what matters is the impact of the tax and welfare systems 
overall on the post-tax distribution of incomes. Income tax may be a 
more suitable instrument to achieve any desired redistribution than are 
property taxes.
The quest by social scientists, in particular economists, for an 
optimally designed tax system dates back to at least Adam Smith.34 It 
was formalised in the so called ‘theory of optimal taxation’ during the 
last century, with seminal contributions by Frank Ramsey35 and Nobel 
laureate James Mirrlees36, among others. Mirrlees was also the lead 
author of the most comprehensive review of the UK tax system to date: 
the Mirrlees Review that was published exactly a decade ago.37 
Existing tax systems, however, are not the design of a ‘benevolent 
planner’ but rather the product of an evolutionary process over 
centuries and are path dependent. Taxation systems are ultimately 
the outcome of a (murky) political process and any tax reform will in 
33. Paul Cheshire and Christian Hilber, “Office space supply restrictions in Britain: the political 
economy of market revenge”, Economic Journal (2008), F185-F221.
34. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, discussed major criteria that “good taxes” should meet: 
taxes should be proportionate to incomes or ability to pay, certain rather than arbitrary, payable at 
times and in ways convenient to taxpayers and cheap to administer and collect.
35. Frank Ramsey, “A contribution to the theory of taxation”, Economic Journal (1927), 47-61.
36. James Mirrlees, “An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation”, Review of Economic 
Studies (1971), 175-208.
37. Mirrlees et al, “Tax by design”.
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practice have winners and losers. Thus, a tax design that is optimal in 
the eyes of economists is not necessarily politically feasible. In fact, 
taxes that fare well from an efficiency point of view often fare poorly 
from a political point of view.38
While we believe that tax reform should be first and foremost dictated 
by economic considerations, political factors are real constraints that 
should not be ignored. Put differently, a ‘second best’ option for tax 
reform that not only generates a substantial improvement over the 
existing system but also has a realistic chance of political success, is 
arguably better than the ‘first best’ solution that is bound to lead to 
political failure. 
We now propose and detail the economic and political 




Essentially, this considers the difficulty of avoiding the tax, the cost of 
collection and the amount of revenue raised. The latter is particularly 
fundamental considering the rising budget deficit caused by the 
measures introduced by the Government to combat COVID-19.
Revenue raising will depend on the nature and total value of the tax 
base and how the tax base responds to rising tax rates. The tax base is 
greater for taxes on the transaction value of property compared to taxes 
on the increase in property value. 
One significant advantage of all property taxes, in terms of their 
revenue raising capacity, is that property is visible and immobile. 
There is, however, an important distinction between annual property 
or land value taxes and transaction taxes. The latter appear to be 
avoidable, in contrast to the former. Especially if transaction tax 
38. Margaret Thatcher’s poll tax was one of the most unpopular taxes in recent history.
32
Home truths
rates rise beyond a certain level, the incentives not to sell and, for 
example, rent out or keep the property vacant for periods of time 
increase39. In the case of the former, property or land value taxes, 
owners or occupants cannot avoid the tax, although with rising tax 
rates, property and land values fall as higher tax rates are negatively 
capitalised into property and land values.40 
Efficiency
A system of taxation or a tax is generally considered to be efficient if 
it allows governments to raise a certain amount of revenue with the 
lowest deadweight loss to society. 
Tax systems tend to be more efficient the more neutral are the 
underlying taxes. The more neutral a tax, the less distorted are the 
decisions of the economic agents, and the lower, consequently, the 
deadweight losses associated with the revenue generation. 
The concept of tax neutrality dates back to Ramsey, who argued 
that the ‘social planner’ should impose taxes in inverse proportion to 
the representative consumer’s elasticity of demand – in other words, 
the responsiveness of demand to prices – for that good.41 This would 
minimise social welfare losses. For example, independent of the public 
health arguments, cigarettes or alcohol should be taxed more heavily as 
the demand for these types of goods is unlikely to be very responsive 
to price increases. 
Seen purely through this lens of neutrality, the optimal tax would be 
a lump-sum tax.42 A lump-sum tax is neutral in that it does not create 
incentives for individuals to change their behaviour, which could be 
39. Or give incentives to evade by, for example, declaring false values. The same can apply to taxes 
on capital gains.
40. Christian Hilber, “The economic implications of house price capitalization: a synthesis”, Real 
Estate Economics (2017), 301-339.
41. Ramsey, “A contribution to the theory of taxation”.
42. A tax on the value of land is associated with fewer distortions than a tax on the value of 
properties. This is because the supply of structures and improvements is not fixed and imposing a 
tax on the value of properties, therefore penalises investment in buildings and so distorts land use 
decisions. However, even a land value tax is not completely neutral.
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associated with welfare losses. However, lump-sum taxes fare very 
poorly in terms of equity and public acceptability, other criteria we 
outline below.43
Non-neutral taxes distort consumer and producer choices. They also 
lead consumers and firms to devote socially wasteful efforts to try to 
avoid these taxes, for example hiring lawyers and accountants who 
help to restructure financial activities in a manner that minimises tax 
liability. Such distortions are greater when there are tax-free schedules, 
as affected individuals will try hard to stay below the relevant thresholds. 
More neutral taxes, therefore, contribute to efficiency by ensuring that 
something closer to an optimal allocation of the means of production 
is achieved.
In some instances, imposing a tax or subsidy may actually lead to a 
social welfare gain, even if we ignore what the tax revenue is used for. 
This is the case when a tax is implemented to correct so-called market 
failures, such as negative externalities. Textbook examples are the 
congestion charge or a tax on polluting behaviour. More relevant to this 
report, a discount on tax paid determined by the energy efficiency of 
buildings or land uses, or, on improvements to their energy efficiency 
could increase social welfare. These taxes and subsidies fare particularly 
well on efficiency grounds.
Taxes are also more efficient to the extent they have low collection 
and administration costs. These costs tend to be lower for national 
compared to local taxes because of the economies of scale in collecting 
taxes. Property taxes may be to an extent an exception here: they require 
a valuation of individual buildings which, with traditional methods of 
valuation, implies visits and a local administrative structure to organise 
the process. The tax base is easier to assess for transfer taxes vis-à-vis 
annual taxes on property or land values.
43. Lump sum taxes like Margaret Thatcher’s poll tax are therefore arguably not a sensible option 





This is essentially about whether reforms are likely to increase the 
equality in the post-tax income and/or wealth distribution. In other 
words, whether the distributional impacts of reforms are ‘progressive’.
It is worth noting, however, that one can distinguish between two 
forms of fairness, the guiding principle for equity. The ability-to-pay 
principle states that individuals with higher income and wealth should 
pay more taxes (vertical equity) and that individuals with higher 
necessary expenses, all else equal, should pay less (horizontal equity). 
The benefits principle, in contrast, stipulates that individuals should 
pay taxes based on the benefits they receive from public services. 
While vertical equity justifies imposing progressive taxes, horizontal 
equity rationalises deductions and tax credits. In any society where equality 
is valued, progressive taxation will be an important policy instrument. 
Mirrlees pointed out, however, that with progressive income taxation 
there is a point of diminishing return, when higher tax rates reduce the 
motivation of productive workers.44 In his theoretical work Mirrlees tried 
to find a balance between equity and efficiency: a point where taxation 
provides a shared benefit to society in the form of achieving equity goals 
without creating an onerous burden on individuals. 
Simplicity
A good tax is simple: it is easy to understand and administer. Simplicity 
tends to help improve the willingness to comply with a tax, reduces 
socially wasteful efforts to avoid taxes, and reduces administration and 
collection costs. An example of a tax that fares well on simplicity grounds 
is a transaction tax with a single tax rate on the value of the transaction.
Incentives for housing supply 
Considering the restricted supply of housing in England and the 
impact this has had on housing affordability, a replacement property tax 
44. Mirrlees, “An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation”.
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system should seek to increase incentives for housing supply. Increasing 
supply would, in the long run, make housing more affordable. 
One particular issue in England is the fact that Local (Planning) 
Authorities, under the current system of residential property taxation, 
have few fiscal incentives – indeed a net negative incentive – to permit 
residential development. Since planning decisions are almost the only 
sphere in which LAs have real control, local property tax revenues 
generate real incentives to which local communities and their political 
leadership react. Unless additional houses transparently generate more 
revenue for the communities which accommodate them, there is a 
strong disincentive for LAs to permit new development. This is because 
they (and their residents) largely face the costs associated with new 
residential developments (infrastructure related costs, more congested 
roads, more congested schools and changes to school catchment areas, 
higher spending on local state schools and higher expenditures on 
other local public services) but they reap very few of the benefits in the 
form of additional CT revenue. And since central government grants 
to LAs are needs-based any increase in CT revenue the LA may get is 
liable to be clawed back. Likewise, local residents, especially if they are 
homeowners, have strong incentives to oppose new developments.
Over the years the cumulative restrictiveness of local planning 
committees has greatly reduced housing supply and seriously damaged 
affordability as well as having other distorting effects, including on 
residential vacancy rates and commuting distances.45 
Taxes that create revenue locally – if the revenue is not redistributed 
away in the longer-term via the central government grants system – 
provide stronger incentives to LAs to permit residential development, 
thus addressing in the longer run the housing affordability crisis. 
There are lessons to be learned from how we tax commercial buildings. 
Commercial buildings are still subject to the Uniform Business Rates 
45. Paul Cheshire, Christian Hilber and Hans R.A. Koster, “Empty homes, longer commutes: the 




(UBR), introduced at almost the same time as the Poll Tax in the late 
Thatcher period. Unlike the CT it is still levied on the assessed rental 
value (not capital value) of buildings. Owners, not occupiers, are those 
ultimately responsible for its payment, although owners can structure 
agreements in a way to make occupiers pay. Far more importantly, while 
the old business rates were a local tax (although still ultimately subject 
to revenue equalisation – or claw back), the main point of the reform 
that established the UBR was to transform it into a national tax. This 
reflected the distrust the then Conservative Government had for the 
suspected militant socialist tendencies of swathes of local government 
thought to be stifling enterprise with punitive business rates. 
The irony is that introducing the UBR caused business costs 
to increase in the long term by a larger amount than any feasible 
business rate would have done.46 Revenues from business rates prior 
to the introduction of the UBR already largely flowed to HM Treasury 
because of the central government grant system of local government 
finance, but the change to the UBR made this confiscation of revenues 
transparent. This had such a disincentive effect on the willingness of 
LAs to give permission for new commercial development that over ten 
years the reduction in the supply of business premises caused rents of 
commercial space to rise by more than any feasible business rate. This 
strongly underlines the importance of property taxes in the structure of 
incentives faced by LAs which in the long run determine the supply of 
all types of property via the planning system, which LAs largely control. 
Automatic stabilisation 
A good replacement system for residential property taxation should 
ensure revenues would offset for the economic cycle. Taxes that help 
counter swings in the economic cycle provide automatic stabilisation. 
Given that residential property cycles tend to be pro-cyclical, taxes 
on the value of land or property, or on property transactions, tend to 
46. Cheshire and Hilber, “Office space supply restrictions in Britain”.
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all be automatic stabilisers. The one exception is the CT, which, given 
no revaluation for 30 years, has failed to provide any stabilisation. 
Conversely, because land values tend to be much more cyclical than 
construction cost, a tax based on land value has the strongest potential 
to automatically stabilise economic cycles. 
Political criteria
Public acceptability 
The reality is that every tax reform generates winners and losers. 
Generally, a tax reform can be expected to be more likely to succeed if 
it appeals to the ‘pivotal voter’. This suggests that tax reforms that benefit 
and are supported by a majority of the public are more likely to succeed. 
Tax reforms that make future tax burdens more predictable are more 
likely to succeed than those that create greater uncertainty. One way of 
increasing the public acceptability of any reform may thus be to try to 
minimise uncertainty (for example, via smoothing annual tax adjustments 
over a number of years), especially during any transition phase. 
Related to this are more recent insights from behavioural economics 
suggesting that salient taxes – such as an annual tax on land or property 
values47 – while faring well on welfare economics and even equity 
grounds – tend to be much less popular than less salient and, in theory, 
avoidable taxes, such as the SDLT. The suggestion made by Muellbauer 
that there should be provisions for deferring liability to pay property 
taxes under defined circumstance until death when the tax debt would 
be settled out of the estate may be an attractive way of making changes 
more acceptable.48 It would avoid the problem of large payments having 
47. Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby, “The hated property tax: salience, tax rates, and tax revolts” 
NBER Working Paper No. 18514 (2012) explores the link between salience and popularity of taxes, by 
means of analyzing local property taxes. Their starting point is the observation that the property tax 
is the most salient major tax in the U.S. but also the least popular tax. They show empirically that tax 
escrow, which makes taxpayers less informed about the taxes they pay, via reducing the salience of 
property taxes increases property tax rates.
48. Muellbauer, “Housing, debt and the economy”.
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to be made by asset rich and income poor individuals, soften the blow 
of a revaluation making big increases to the (perceived) liability of 
some individuals and imbue the tax with a degree of being to some 
extent ‘voluntary’.
Ease of transition to reformed system
Perhaps the single most important obstacle to meaningful tax reform 
is the issue of transitioning from one system to another. While it is 
argued that proposed property tax reforms are associated with large 
welfare gains or equity improvements, the alleged or real difficulties 
of making the change and uncertainty created during the transition 
phase are often sufficient to persuade policy makers against action. 
The likelihood of success of a tax reform is crucially determined 
by lobbying. The economist and political scientist Mancur Olson has 
shown that what stimulates people to act in groups are strong incentives 
and an ability to organise.49 Applied to tax reform, small groups that 
are strongly adversely affected by a tax reform are more likely to act 
on shared objectives, as members are strongly motivated and smaller 
groups are easier to organise to act (lobby) on these shared objectives.50 
Large groups that experience smaller benefits are unlikely to act in 
accordance with common interest. 
It is therefore strongly preferable to phase tax reforms over longer 
time periods to avoid substantial redistribution between winners and 
losers over short time periods. Evidence in support of this proposition 
is the successful phasing out of the Mortgage Interest Relief at Source 
(MIRAS) during the 1990s. 
49. Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Mancur Olson, The rise and decline of nations: economic 
growth, stagflation, and social rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
50. This argument also significantly explains the power of the NIMBY lobby. New development 
causes significant and very local costs and losses. However, the gains – in the form of lower house 
prices and more housing choices are very thinly spread over a wide area and large numbers. Since 
the planning system is controlled locally, losers not only have a greater incentive to lobby, they also 
control decision-making.
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Alignment with Government objectives
At least in the short term, policies that are in broad alignment with 
the sitting Government’s key priorities are more likely to gain traction 
and ultimately be implemented. Since the focus of this report’s 
political analysis is on public acceptability and ease of transition, the 
government’s policy priorities are, therefore, important elements in 
the political context in which reforms are being proposed. The current 
Conservative Government has two central policy objectives that seem 
particularly relevant when considering proposals for property taxation. 
The first is ‘levelling up’, which can be described as addressing regional 
disparities. The second is making progress towards the legal target of 
net zero emissions by 2050. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, 
that policy ideas which advance these objectives are more likely to be 
adopted and implemented by this current Government.
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Chapter 3:  Options for reforming  
the English residential  
property tax system
Although we have stressed the importance of viewing property taxes 
in the context of the whole system of taxation and the incentives it 
generates with respect to housing supply, our main focus is on how we 
should tax residential property in England in a way that is different to 
the inefficient and inequitable way we do at the moment.
Although it could be seen as administratively easiest to update 
valuations and extend CT bands, we dismiss this outright. First, any 
such reform would not resolve the fatal flaw in the design of CT – that, 
in trying to tax both property and people, it is an imprecise fudge. Put 
another way, CT is not a pure or equitable tax on property values, but 
nor does it relate to or pay for the cost of local services. It tries to be 
both a property tax and a services tax, but is effective at neither. 
Second, a common argument in favour of CT is that it is established, 
simple, and easy to understand. But the arcane process which backdates 
values to a hypothetical 1991 value for new houses is not understood by 
ordinary people; nor are the arbitrary ‘bands’. A straightforward system 
attaching the tax people pay to the current value of their homes would 
not only make the system fairer but more transparent and so, probably, 
more acceptable.
Finally, a stop-gap reform of CT would really be no easier than a 
more systematic and thought through reform. In order to mitigate the 
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deficiencies of CT – and avoid a return to the inequities in the effective 
property tax rates we see today and discussed above – regular revaluations 
are essential, just as they would be under alternative proposals. It would 
be preferable, therefore, to accompany regular revaluations with a more 
transparent and coherently designed system and devise a system for 
cheaply and fairly keeping assessed property values up to date.
There are attractive alternative options for property taxation that 
would score much more highly on the economic and political criteria we 
have identified than the current system of CT, SDLT, S106 Agreements 
and the CIL. 
In our judgement any residential property tax reform should be required 
to have an annual revaluation. In principle, this is an easy and cheap task 
so long as it does not rely on traditional valuation techniques but uses 
statistical methods. Price data are now readily available, as are basic house 
characteristics and exact locations. The current price of all houses could 
be modelled, with transactions prices replacing estimated prices as sales 
took place. To avoid large fluctuations, while prices should be estimated 
annually, taxes should be levied on a three to five year moving average. 
While to make the idea more acceptable there should be carefully 
defined grounds for appeal, it would be vital to tightly define those 
grounds and ensure only a small number of cases were worth appealing 
– an outcome of good modelling and stringent appeal criteria. If not, 
the costs of proper reform would rise substantially. 
This modelling-based approach has been extensively applied elsewhere. 
Advances in data availability (Land Registry price paid data only became 
available some 20 years ago), modelling methods and computing power 
mean that modelling house prices is now a perfectly practical and 
cheap method. The use of statistical methods of property appraisal for 
tax purposes is widespread: “At least 15 countries have implemented 
statistical mass appraisal systems for the use in property taxation”.51 
51. Jens Kolbe, Rainer Schulz, Martin Wersing and Axel Werwatz, “Land value appraisal using 




There are two main policy options for residential property taxation 
we consider.
 z An annual tax on the value of property: commonly referred to as 
an Annual Proportional Property Tax (APPT)
 z An annual tax on the value of land: commonly referred to as a Land 
Value Tax (LVT)
Either of these two main options could replace the two main forms of 
property tax we have in England: CT and SDLT.
Annual Proportional Property Tax on current capital 
value of housing (or APPT)
The idea of the APPT is simple: impose a proportional tax on the value 
of residential properties. 
In this scenario, land with buildings on it is taxed by an APPT since 
the value of the land which is legally attached to the buildings is fully 
reflected in the price of the whole property. 
A question which arises is whether to tax undeveloped (brownfield 
or greenfield, including agricultural land) land separately: just as there 
is a case for taxing second or additional homes so there is an argument 
for taxing land that could have buildings on it. Otherwise landowners 
have an implicit incentive not to build. Or, put differently, taxing land 
without buildings on it generates an incentive to develop the land or to 
sell it to a developer who will. The other reforms we detail below would 
tax empty land but the problem here is how to identify land that could 
be built on. 
Another important question is how much of the revenue from the 
APPT should go to national and how much to local governments. This is a 
crucial consideration, not only because each layer of government (central 
and local) has its roles and respective services to fund, but also because 
allowing LAs to derive substantive revenue from local development (new 
and existing) via the APPT that compensates for the local services and 
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the local infrastructure it has to fund, provides important incentives for 
LAs to permit residential development in the first place. 
We propose to allow separate ‘national’ and ‘local’ tax rates. The 
national tax rate would be set such as to offset the loss of revenue to 
central government from phasing out the SDLT. LAs can then set their 
own tax rates, independently of the central government, with the local 
revenues used to provide local services the residents want, with no 
central government claw back mechanism. 
A number of previous proposals for an APPT have demonstrated 
that, properly designed, an APPT would be considerably more 
progressive than the current system of CT and SDLT. Our simulations 
of possible outcomes – see Table 5.1 later – is broadly consistent with 
this, although the replacement of only the SDLT with an APPT would 
increase inequality, as the former is even more progressive (although 
otherwise deeply flawed) than the latter.
First, Fairer Share have proposed a national APPT set at 0.48% for 
primary residences and 0.96% for second homes, levied on property 
owners, with a national component that would go to central government 
for redistribution and an initial floating local component to go to LAs. 
The tax would replace CT and SDLT.52 
Fairer Share estimate that 76% of households would pay less in 
property tax under this proposal, with an average saving of £435 a year.53 
Their constituency-level analysis illustrated the potential spatial impact 
of an APPT along these lines. In large areas of the North their modelling 
suggested the majority of households – in some constituencies, 100% – 
would gain. The main losers from the reform would be in London and 
the South-East, where both house prices and incomes are higher. In 
these areas, they estimated there would be fewer winners.54 
52. Fairer Share, “What are we proposing?”, https://fairershare.org.uk/proportional-property-tax/ 
(2021).
53. Fairer Share, “Our response to Financial Secretary to HM Treasury, the Rt Hon. Jesse Norman”, 
https://fairershare.org.uk/our-response-to-jesse-norman-mp-hm-treasury/ (2021).
54. Fairer Share, “Constituency data”, https://fairershare.org.uk/constituency-data/ (2021).
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In order to smooth the transition to an APPT, Fairer Share further 
propose that the new system be phased in over a three year period, 
with increases in property taxes are capped at £1,200 and individuals 
able to defer payment of the tax to alleviate the ‘property rich, cash 
poor’ issue.55 
Second, the Resolution Foundation, as part of the work of its 
Intergenerational Commission, published an exhaustive report 
modelling a range of reforms including adjustments of CT rates 
within existing valuation structures and a version of an APPT on 
current property values (annually revalued) at rates of 0.5 and 0.7%, 
with tax free thresholds of £100,000 or regional variations of that to 
make the tax more progressive. These simulations are carefully done 
and show both the seriously regressive nature of the current CT and 
how proportional taxes with tax-free thresholds can at the same 
time generate larger revenues and be substantially more progressive, 
both across income groups and regions. Given their focus they also 
estimated the distributional impact by age group of the various options 
for reform. Younger age groups, especially households in their twenties 
and thirties, are the most likely to gain from the APPT plus tax-free 
threshold reform.56 
Annual proportional tax on current capital value of 
‘unimproved’ land (LVT)
The idea of a tax on unimproved land value is again simple: as with the 
APPT, impose a proportional tax on the value of land independent of 
whether or not the land has buildings on it. Like with the APPT, we 
would propose national and local tax rates. 
Taxes on ‘unimproved’ land value, that is on the underlying value 
of land, not on the value of the buildings on that land, have long been 
55. Fairer Share, “Frequently asked questions”, https://fairershare.org.uk/faq/ (2021).
56. Adam Corlett and Laura Gardiner, “Home affairs: options for reforming property taxation”, 
https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/home-affairs-options-for-reforming-property-
taxation/ (2018).
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regarded by economists as perhaps the most efficient type of tax. Its 
attraction is that it is largely neutral with respect to the impact on the 
incentives faced by economic agents and it generates incentives to use 
land for the most productive use permitted. This is because the tax – 
usually advocated as an annual payment of a fraction of the current 
capital value of land – would be levied on the most productive use to 
which any parcel of land is currently permitted to be put: not on the use 
it happens to be in at the present time. It would thus generate incentives 
to use land (and by implication the buildings on them) more efficiently. 
Not only does it not penalise the owners’ investment, but such a tax 
potentially captures increases in value resulting from public investment 
in flood prevention or infrastructure. This has the merit of increasing 
the tax base to pay for public goods.
Indeed, in principle, a LVT would be desirable not just for housing 
but for all land, whether used for commercial buildings, golf courses, 
agriculture or land that is simply empty. It would be as near to a neutral 
tax as one could find and would generate systematic incentives to use 
land for the purpose most valuable to the economy and society.
Box 3.1. Augmented Land Value Taxes
While primarily designed as an efficient way to tax land, LVTs can 
be designed in such a way as to complement other policy goals, 
such as net zero, and mitigate implementation issues around 
distributional impacts and payment of the tax. 
Muellbauer argues strongly for a modified LVT. This would 
replace all existing property taxes, but be augmented to reflect 
external effects. So the taxes paid would be reduced in proportion 
to the energy efficiency of buildings on it. Recognising a possible 
political objection to such taxes – that they fall heavily on the 
asset rich but income poor such as pensioners – he also argued 
that payment of his land value tax should, if desired, be able to be 
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deferred indefinitely with payment recovered out of the owners’ 
estate on death. Thus the payment of the land tax is ingeniously 
made to appear to the land owner almost as voluntary: they could 
if they choose, not pay it at all but leave payment to their heirs. 
Such a feature should largely overcome the ‘asset rich, cash poor’ 
objection often raised against reform.57 
A general consideration with land taxes is of making reliable and 
acceptable valuations of the value of underlying land. When the land 
is built on – has a house on it – there will be many transactions of 
the ‘house plus land’ bundles. Put another way, we know the price of 
‘houses’, including the value of the land they stand on, but the value of 
the land itself is hidden within the total – not identifiable separately. As 
has been widely demonstrated, information on house prices (including 
land) can be used to power efficient and robust statistical models for 
easily valuing houses and land together and to provide frequent, cheap 
re-valuations. But the specific price of underlying land – separate from 
buildings – remains opaque.
Even the concept of ‘unimproved land value’ is a complex one. It 
does not correspond to the observed market price of empty plots of 
land for building, since such prices will embody expectations about the 
probability, cost and time required to obtain planning permission and 
the cost of any S106 Agreements or CIL that may be imposed. Later, 
where we explore the implications of our two main options in more 
detail, the ‘land values’ used to estimate the total value of land by LA 
are those of the Valuations Office Agency (VOA). These are assessed by 
professional valuers and exclude the costs of steering a development 
through the planning system. They may reflect expert judgement rather 
than scientific data, but they do appear to conform to the intended 
57. Muellbauer, “Housing, debt and the economy”.
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concept: to reflect the price of ‘unimproved land’. Since all values are 
estimated on more or less the same methods and assumptions, they 
should also be appropriate for comparative purposes: to address, for 
example, the question of how much the total area of land used for 
housing in Barnett is worth in comparison to that in Redcar. Equally, 
comparisons over time should be valid, subject to the inevitable 
variation between individual valuers.
Nevertheless, the practical difficulties of generating reliable and 
publicly acceptable values for ‘unimproved land’ which could then 
be used as a tax base on which to levy a proportionate tax remain a 
significant problem associated with applying the theoretically appealing 
idea of charging all taxes on property on the basis of the underlying 
land. While VOA valuations would arguably be the closest workable 
approximation to a measure of unimproved land value, they necessarily 
involve a degree of judgement and interpretation. Given that all such 
values reflect the professional but personal judgements of individual 
valuers and there are next to no observed transactions against which 
to verify those judgements, the scope for appeal and litigation would 
seem extreme. 
Both the two main options we have identified – an APPT and a LVT 
– can be considered with important modifications:
 z Tax exemptions, to support those with more modest means
 z Green offsets, to support energy efficiency improvements and help 
achieve the important Government objective of net zero by 2050
Tax exemptions
Introducing tax exemptions within the APPT or LVT is associated 
with an obvious potential trade-off: the exemption helps achieve 
the equity goal, but it may hurt tax efficiency. This is because a tax 
exemption threshold will tend to trigger tax avoidance in the form of 
manipulation of the tax base. Indeed, a tax exemption may be more 
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problematic for a LVT than APPT. This is because land (in contrast to 
housing) can more easily be subdivided and allocated amongst family 
members in such a way as to take advantage of the tax exemption. 
However, so long as reforms are robustly designed, tax avoidance is 
unlikely to constitute a major problem for an APPT or LVT. In contrast 
to income or wealth, real property is impossible to hide. So as long 
as there are no other exemptions from the APPT (such as for empty 
homes), the owner will not be able to avoid or evade the tax payment.
Another issue is that tax exemptions have an opportunity cost in 
the form of foregone net tax revenue. The exception is up to the point 
where an individual tax payment is less than the costs of collecting it. 
This provides a good reason for setting the exemption threshold low.
We suggest setting it initially at £50,000. Houses or land worth less 
than that would pay no tax: above that threshold, tax would be paid 
on the whole value. Since a tax rate of 0.5 % on £50,000 would yield 
only £250 of revenue but would cost a significant amount to collect, the 
revenue effects of such a threshold are negligible as too, therefore, will 
be the costs in terms of efficiency.
Although redistribution is an important consideration for property 
taxes, there are other tax instruments – crucially, progressive income 
taxes – that can be used more effectively for redistributive purposes. 
That said, there is an argument in favour of a redistributive element in 
APPT in particular. 
As Mirrlees, for example, highlighted, there comes a point where 
raising income tax rates generates disincentives to work: so income 
taxes that are too high become sufficiently non-neutral to cause 
deadweight losses.58 While high tax rates on APPT might have the 
effect that wealthy individuals invest in assets other than real property, 
this would actually have the positive side effect of more affordable land 
and housing space. This is because wealthy investors would have fewer 
incentives to hoard their wealth in land or second homes, thereby 
58. Mirrlees, “An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation”.
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reducing investment driven demand and resulting higher prices and 
rents. Thus, although tax exemptions are not unproblematic, there 
are good grounds to opt for them. Moreover, there are at present no 
progressive wealth taxes – only progressive taxes on income – and as 
housing has over many decades become a more and more important 
component of individual wealth holdings, the case for a progressive tax 
on property seems to have become stronger.
Green offsets
These would be a reduction in the tax rate calibrated to reflect the 
energy efficiency of the building(s), or conversely an increase in the 
tax rate for energy inefficient buildings. While green offsets would 
be most readily applied to the APPT, they could also be incorporated 
into a LVT as Muellbauer has outlined.59 Hitting net zero by 2050 is an 
important Government objective and, while progress has been made 
in other economic sectors, the contribution of the residential sector to 
CO2 emissions has risen steadily. Thus, an effective policy to reduce 
residential CO2 emissions is vital.
The green offsets could aim to be revenue neutral: a tax for energy 
inefficient buildings below a certain rating and a subsidy for energy 
efficient buildings above a certain rating. 
While green offsets are a subsidy, or negative tax, their purpose is to 
internalise market failure in the form of greenhouse gas emissions and 
other negative externalities associated with energy inefficient buildings. 
In this sense – that they shift consumption choices distorted by a failure 
to pay for the social costs back to a neutral position – green offsets 
would score highly for efficiency.
Subsidies to incentivise energy efficient buildings are not new in 
public policy: the Green Deal and Green Homes Grant are two recent 
examples of public policy that sought to help homeowners to meet the 
cost of domestic energy improvements. However, the popularity of such 
59. Muellbauer, “Housing, debt and the economy”.
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schemes has been undermined by a complicated application process, 
such that the Green Homes Grant was phased out in March 2021. 
It is clear that the public are supportive of more action on energy 
efficiency in the abstract: in a recent Bright Blue report, for example, 
69% of the UK public reported that they support government subsidies 
for installing better home insulation. Moreover, the public marginally 
prefers policy approaches that use financial incentives (a ‘carrot’) 
rather than regulations that impose a ‘stick’ on behaviour (49% and 
34% respectively).60 This suggests that the problem is not the principle 
of policies to incentivise energy efficiency, but rather their design 
and implementation. Green offsets would address this concern, by 
circumventing the need for bureaucratic application processes and 
making salient the energy efficiency of homes while still providing a 
clear financial incentive to improve energy efficiency.
Green offsets do have two drawbacks. First, not only do they not 
generate any tax revenue (at least if they are designed as offsets rather 
than as a tax on energy inefficient buildings), but they represent an 
opportunity cost to the taxpayer in the form of foregone tax revenue. 
Second, green offsets are likely to be regressive, as lower income 
households tend to be less likely to be able to afford investments in 
energy efficiency. However, green offsets fare extremely well from a 
welfare economics point of view as they correct a market failure and 
thus are associated with a welfare gain – a gain to society – in contrast 
to other taxes that distort consumer behaviour and thus induce a 
deadweight loss. There are thus strong welfare economic reasons to add 
this feature to any property tax. Relinquishing green offsets on equity 
grounds would also be foolish. This is because redistribution can be 
achieved with other tax instruments (such as a progressive income tax 
or an APPT with tax exemption) much more effectively. Thus, while 
green offsets are not a ‘free lunch’ they should, in our assessment, be 
60. Anvar Sarygulov, “Going greener? Public attitudes to net zero”, http://www.brightblue.org.uk/
portfolio/going-greener-public-attitudes-to-net-zero/ (2020).
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part of any reformed property tax system. Green offsets would also 
contribute to the Government objective of net zero emissions by 2050.
Development Levy
Finally, we consider an alternative option to another element of 
the English residential property taxation system: the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and Section 106 (S106) Agreements, which 
the Government proposes to consolidate into a single Infrastructure 
Levy (IL).We consider an alternative to this IL: a Development Levy 
which would be a uniform proportionate levy on sales price with the 
rate set nationally. 
This would effectively amount to a levy on land value uplift.61 
As already discussed, the two current mechanisms for attempting 
to capture land value uplift, S106 Agreements and CIL, are highly 
imperfect. The costs and uncertainty involved with negotiating S106 
Agreements in particular, depress housing supply by making otherwise 
viable developments too risky and expensive. Nevertheless, new 
building does impose costs on the local community which, if they were 
efficiently offset, would be likely to make development more acceptable 
to local residents (who control the planning decision process) and so 
improve housing supply and in the long run housing affordability. 
Since these costs are associated only with new development the 
proposal is to charge a so-called Development Levy as a percentage of 
the realised price of all new houses built.
As currently proposed, the IL would act as a straightforward 
levy (payable at the point of occupation) on land value uplift above 
a minimum threshold. The intention behind this is to streamline 
development negotiations and make the process for capturing land 
value uplift more transparent.
The Development Levy we propose here goes further than the IL, by 
tying revenues to delivery of local infrastructure and public services 
61. Paul Cheshire, “How to capture land value rises”, Planning (2017), 16-18.
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necessary to support the additional residents and to providing social 
or affordable housing. In other words, there should be an obligation, 
imposed by national government, to devote a fixed proportion of the 
proceeds of the Development Levy to procure affordable housing 
commissioned from suppliers such as Housing Associations. This 
would more than offset the loss of such housing consequent on the 
abolition of S106.
The reason why revenues should be spent on expanding local 
infrastructure and public services is obvious: additional residents add 
to the demand for these and under the current system of S106 and CIL, 
as well as the proposed IL in its current form, no funds are guaranteed 
to flow to local government to pay for them. 
Additional affordable housing is also an appropriate object since 
currently most affordable housing is sourced via S106 Agreements, 
which are very inefficient. 
A levy charged at 20% of market prices could yield very substantial 
revenues.62 If one takes £225,000 as an estimate of the average price 
of a new house in England and construction a modest 200,000 a year, 
that generates £9 billion a year (compared to the SDLT revenues of 
£11.5 billion for 2019-20). Although transition arrangements might be 
necessary because some developers would hold land bought at prices 
not including an expected 20% Development Levy paid on completed 
houses, the tax would in the long run be entirely capitalised into 
the price of land – so in that sense be neutral – and would increase 
developers’ house building because there would be no negotiation costs 
or uncertainty associated with it. So long as the revenues it generated 
were exempt from claw back, so genuinely increased resources and 
public service provision for the local communities housing new 
development, they would reduce opposition to development and lead 
to a relaxation of NIMBYism. 
62. Paul Cheshire and Boyana Buyuklieva, “Homes on the right tracks: greening the Green Belt to solve 
the housing crisis”, https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/homes-on-the-right-tracks/ (2019).
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Conclusion
Ultimately, we believe that there are six specific options for property 
tax reform that should be rated against the economic and political 
criteria we have identified.
1. APPT on current value of housing
2. APPT on current value of housing plus a tax exemption
3. LVT on current value of unimproved land
4. LVT on current value of unimproved land plus a tax exemption
5. Green offsets on APPT or LVT
6. A Development Levy
In the next section, we assess and score each of these specific options 
against the economic and political criteria we identified earlier.
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Chapter 4:  Assessment of options  
for reforming the  
English residential  
property tax system
Now let us assess the six specific models for reform of residential 
property taxation against our economic and political criteria.
Revenue raising
Both the APPT and the LVT have the potential to raise large revenues, 
particularly as property and land are immobile. The capacity to raise 
revenue of the APPT exceeds that of the LVT, given that the potential 
tax base is larger; total property values in the UK exceed total 
unimproved land values. In particular, since it is easier to subdivide 
land and so manipulate values to get below the threshold and avoid 
tax, our judgement is that the LVT would be less efficient at raising 
revenue than the APPT. 
Since the proposed tax exemption threshold of £50,000 is very 
low, our judgement is that the addition of such an exemption 
threshold to an APPT or LVT would have a negligible impact on 
the net tax revenue. 
The impact on revenue of a green offset tax would not be great in 
any circumstances, but would vary according to whether it was an 
allowance to set against tax liability for more energy efficient houses; 
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a tax on less energy efficient ones; or, a revenue neutral combination 
of the two.63 
The capacity to raise revenue of our proposed Development Levy is 
somewhat lower as it only applies to new developments. However, the 
cost of collection should be very low. 
Efficiency
The LVT is the most economically efficient form of tax.
Versions of either the APPT or LVT with a tax exemption, however, 
will be slightly less efficient from an economic viewpoint since they 
create an incentive for deadweight losses in activities designed to 
reduce liability. 
The green offsets tax is highly efficient in that it corrects a market 
failure to restore efficiency. 
The Development Levy fares least well here, as one issue of the levy 
is that it taxes capital investment rather than just the land value uplift, 
its main aim. That said, quantifying and taxing just the land value uplift 
is problematic in practice and the Development Levy still fares better 
than S106 Agreements and CIL when it comes to efficiency. Apart from 
its other inefficiencies, CIL taxes space that is constructed since it is 
charged per m2.
Equity
Different property taxes do not directly redistribute income since they 
are raised on houses not people. Because there is no data on incomes by 
house it is impossible to estimate this except in broad terms but property 
taxes inevitably have a big influence on post tax income distribution 
since people of different incomes tend to live in houses of different 
63. One drawback of a tax exemption, when combined with a subsidy (tax) on energy (in-)efficient 
housing is that very cheap excluded properties do not have any incentives to improve energy 
efficiency. The tax exemption would not preclude the government however from providing vouchers 
to those living in low-end housing to improve their energy efficiency. For practical purposes, 
however, so few houses would be involved that this possible effect could be ignored.
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values. Rich people on average tend to live in more expensive houses. 
Moreover, since property is locationally fixed, different systems of 
property tax will have different consequences for the spatial distribution 
of incomes, with significant implications for the ‘levelling up’ agenda. 
Both the APPT and the LVT would improve equity since owners of 
more expensive houses or more valuable land would pay more, making 
both options considerably more equitable with respect to property 
value – and therefore, it is safe to assume, income – than CT. Adding a 
tax exemption makes it more equitable still. 
The green offset is, depending on its design, probably regressive, 
if only very mildly so: poorer households live in slightly less energy 
efficient houses but the positive correlation between house prices and 
energy efficiency is only very weak.64 
The Development Levy, particularly after a transition period, would 
divert part of a windfall gain to a few to a wider public good, so improve 
equity, but compensate in kind poorer people by funding social housing.
Simplicity
The APPT scores highly because statistical valuation of houses is 
comparatively cheap and reliable. Running an acceptable appeals 
system would require some thought and administrative innovation, 
but CT bandings can already be appealed. 
In contrast, the LVT would require significant administrative 
and strategic planning and serious, specialised expertise. It is not 
impossible, but if implemented as theoretically intended it would be 
highly innovative in modern times; the only country that currently 
implements a pure land tax, without any supporting taxes on buildings, 
64. For housing units sold in England and Wales in 2019, the unconditional correlation between 
price paid and energy efficiency is 0.0145. Holding constant unobserved characteristics at postcode 
level, a 10% increase in price is associated with an increase in energy efficiency of 0.44% (own 
calculations, based on a merged dataset combining the Land Registry and the Energy Performance 
Certificates datasets). Energy efficiency is measured as the cost of energy required for space heating, 
water heating and lighting (in kWh/year) multiplied by fuel costs, so £/m2/year where the cost is 
derived from kWh.
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is Estonia, as indicated in Table 1.1 earlier in this paper. 
Both green offsets and the Development Levy would be simple to 
implement using existing systems.
Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) already apply. One issue 
is that energy efficiency improvements do not currently improve a 
building’s EPC. However, it would be easy to implement a reform which 
ensured owners were rewarded for investment in energy improvements. 
Since the Development Levy would be applied to the market price 
of newly constructed houses, it would be simple to calculate. The only 
issue would be to ensure avoidance was minimised by for example 
selling completed houses at below market prices to intermediaries.
Incentives for housing supply
Except for the Development Levy and green offsets where there 
would be some incentive to build new houses since they are so much 
more energy efficient than old ones, the performance of the specific 
options is contingent on whether or not proceeds go to LAs or national 
government. 
If LAs are to be persuaded to accommodate more houses – very 
strongly in the interests of the wider community and particularly 
younger people – new building needs to generate revenue. 
This requires a major proportion of property tax revenue to go to local 
communities with no claw back in lost grants from central government. 
There has to be a transparent net revenue gain. So long as a substantial 
portion of the tax revenue is guaranteed to add to LA revenues, there 
will be an incentive effect via the planning system. The revenues from 
new residents would improve the fiscal position of the LA and help to 
improve local infrastructure and public services. 
This report therefore advocates giving the power to LAs to set the 
rate at which they levy the property tax and the ability to retain those 
revenues. At the same time, any loss of revenue to central government 
our proposed changes produce should be compensated. 
So, on the assumption that the equivalent of the revenue from the 
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SDLT would go to the central government as a national precept with 
LAs then free to choose their local tax rate for both APPT and LVT, and 
there is no clawback of locally raised revenue by central government, 
both do give strong incentives for increased housing supply. 
The Development Levy would generate strong incentives for LAs to 
permit development on the grounds that substantial revenue could be 
raised from the new build sales. 
Automatic stabilisation
All specific options, with the exception of green offsets, would tend to 
lift tax revenues in boom times and reduce them in recessions so would 
have some stabilising impact. As land prices are more pro-cyclical than 
house prices, the stabilising effect of the LVT is even greater than that 
of the APPT.
Public acceptability
We think an APPT with annual revaluation and a well-designed 
appeal process would be well received relative to CT and including a 
tax exemption for very low priced properties would improve its public 
acceptability. The basis of the valuation would be transparent (not 
hypothetical 1991 values) and relate to the observable prices of houses 
locally sold; it would also eliminate the grossly regressive nature of CT 
and introduce a movement towards greater equity. 
A central element in our proposed reforms is that LAs should be free 
to set their own rates of tax on property. This means it is impossible to 
know in advance what the spatial and personal distributional impacts 
of them would be. But in Table 5.2 we report simulations of several 
plausible outcomes allowing for differing responses in richer compared 
to poorer LAs. These show that generally poorer communities and 
lower priced houses would tend to pay less, even allowing for the 
abolition of the highly progressive SDLT.
The LVT would suffer because it would be hard to verify valuations 
and the underlying concept is not so easy to grasp. This has the potential 
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to lead to significant barriers to implementation and a complicated 
appeals process.
The green offsets – especially if designed as a subsidy – would likely 
be popular. Their simplicity would give them a big advantage compared 
to previous green subsidies requiring the hassle of application and 
voluntary expenditures by the household. Since they would generate an 
incentive to improve energy efficiency for all households, they would 
also be far more effective. 
The Development Levy would also be likely to be well received as 
it is paid by developers and the incidence is likely such that it reduces 
land prices (so input costs) and does not raise house prices relative 
to the status quo. Since the complexity and costs associated with the 
S106 Agreements system favour the largest developers, vested interests 
might lobby for the status quo.
Ease of transition
Changes inevitably generate losers as well as winners. Since losers tend 
to have strong political influence, there is a powerful argument for 
generous transition arrangements. Where significant gains and losses 
would result – such as with a movement to current house values taxed 
proportionately or the Development Levy on new house construction 
– the changes need to be smoothed over time. 
Moreover, while the logic may be for an annual revaluation of 
properties, it would be better to smooth revaluations by using a moving 
average calculated over three years. Price changes in housing markets 
can be substantial, particularly in a country in which the supply of new 
houses is as unresponsive to demand shocks as in the UK.
Since both the APPT and the LVT would generate substantial change 
in individuals’ tax obligations, there would also be a case for introducing 
provisions for deferring payment until sale of a property or inheritance 
subject to reasonable interest being paid. This would offset the possible 
impact on ‘asset-rich, cash-poor’ taxpayers.
The LVT option, however, would be worse since it would require 
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setting up a novel agency and process. 
Green offsets could easily be implemented as they could build on the 
existing system of EPCs.
The Development Levy might require transitional arrangements to 
accommodate developers with land banks they had bought without 
the expectation of paying the levy on finished houses. That said, all 
developers would try to gain from any transition arrangements and 
would benefit from not having S106 Agreements or CIL. So the net 
effect on the development sector would in reality likely be minor. 
Alignment with Government objectives
The current property tax system – comprising CT, SDLT, S106 and 
CIL – together with specific grants – has been evidently inadequate 
to address the net zero challenge, since emissions from the residential 
sector relative to total emissions have been rising steadily for 30 
years. When it comes to another of the current Government’s central 
objectives – ‘levelling up’ – CT seems to be more of a hindrance than 
a help, considering its spatial impacts (see Panel A of Figure 5.1) and 
the effective tax rates on lower-value properties. The simulation results 
reported in Table 5.1 below are broadly consistent with this diagnosis. 
The set of reforms proposed, particularly the local APPT and the 
Developer Levy, would also incentivise LAs to accept development 
more readily thus supporting the objective of building 300,000 homes 
a year. Overall, therefore, the reform package proposed would support 
three of the government’s central objectives.
Conclusion
To compare the six specific reforms to residential property tax in 
England more exactly, we have scored them against each economic 
and political criterion on a scale of 1 to 10, drawing on our analysis 
above. The results are shown in the Table 4.1 below.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 5:  A new system for taxing 
residential property in England
In theory, an LVT would be the most economically efficient way of 
taxing property. However, this must be weighed against the considerable 
implementation challenges and the political feasibility of such a reform. 
Therefore, based on the analysis of all the economic and political criteria, 
we believe that the current taxation system for residential property 
reform in England should be replaced with the following elements:
 z An Annual Proportional Property Tax (APPT) on the current 
capital value of houses with a tax exemption of initially £50,000 
and a 25% surcharge for second home owners.
 z The national government(s) and LAs to impose separate APPT tax 
rates with LAs retaining the APPT revenues they raise. 
 z Green offsets applied to the APPT to improve energy efficiency. 
 z A Development Levy set at 20% of the realised market price of newly 
constructed houses with revenues spent only on identified purposes. 
Recommendation one: An Annual Proportional Property 
Tax (APPT) on the current capital value of houses, with a tax 
exemption of initially £50,000 and a surcharge for second 
home owners.
Being guided by the principle that the best should not be the enemy of 
the good, we propose an APPT with a tax exemption for houses valued 
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£50,000 or less. 
There are arguments for and against a tax exemption. On balance, 
we suggest introducing one single low threshold of initially £50,000, 
set to rise with house prices over time. This should be low enough to 
eliminate attempts to manipulate values for tax avoidance.
This would be transparently a property tax so liability to pay would 
be with owners. All houses, unless abandoned, would be liable to the 
tax with no discounts for second homes or fewer occupants.
In fact, higher APPT rates on second homes would be likely to be 
politically popular, and much more efficient compared to the higher 
SDLT rates on second homes that are currently in place. The latter 
provides incentives to wealthy second home owners to keep their 
underused or empty properties as capital investments for longer 
without trading them, because this allows them to benefit from any 
capital gains without having to face the transaction tax. Based on this 
rationale, we propose to introduce a 25% tax rate surcharge on second 
homes, so if the APPT rate were 0.5% on primary homes it would be 
0.625% on second homes. This will provide incentives to use living 
space more efficiently and discourages underuse of space or holding 
of property for purely for the prospect of capital gains. The latter is a 
real concern in Britain as the planning system makes housing supply 
extremely unresponsive to price increases so increases in demand 
over time leading to strong price increases as housing supply cannot 
expand. 65
The APPT should have annual revaluation using statistical modelling, 
but with a three-or five-year rolling window to smooth annual changes. 
There should also be an appeals process so house owners could appeal 
against their valuations. This appeals process should be run under the 
auspices of the District Valuer Services (the existing government body 
responsible for providing expert valuation and other property advice 
65. Hilber and Vermeulen, “The impact of supply constraints”; Christian Hilber and Andreas Mense, 




to government and the public sector) with clearly defined rules and 
stringent requirements. Valuations from the national modelling system 
should only be revised on appeal if the appeal tribunal judged there was 
a discrepancy between the assessed value for the period and conditions 
on which it was based departed from an equivalent market value by 
10% or more. 
To avoid sudden and massive one-off redistribution we recommend 
a transition period of, for example, five years, in which there is a 
gradual phasing out of CT and SDLT and a phasing in of the APPT. Or, 
alternatively, a phasing out of the SDLT only and replacing the CT with 
an APPT in one go. Then the rates are adjusted over time, with the aim 
of keeping overall revenues neutral at national level, until the SDLT is 
completely phased out.
There should be a provision, subject to paying interest, to defer tax 
payments for ‘asset rich and cash poor’ individuals until the point at 
which properties are sold or an inheritance takes place. The conditions 
permitting this choice should be clearly defined.
Recommendation two: The national government and LAs to 
impose separate APPT rates 
A share of the revenue of the APPT should go towards the national 
government and a share should go towards LAs. The share going to 
national government should be determined so that it offsets for the 
loss to national revenues of the abolition of SDLT.
Local authorities should be free to set their local tax rates as a 
proportion of the assessed local property value tax base independently 
of national government. Local authorities would be allowed to fully 
retain this revenue and use it on local public services, such as local refuse 
collection, recycling, local parking, environmental improvements, local 
transport infrastructure and services, maintenance of local beauty 
sites or parks, local libraries, and local museums. There should be no 
claw back in the long-term via changes in central government grants 
designed to fund services such as education, which may be locally 
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provided but to national standards.66
This will generate tax incentives at the local level to permit new 
residential development and variety in the range of local services 
communities can offer: put differently, it should generate competition 
amongst local authorities to provide a mix of local services attractive to 
their existing and potential new residents. 
Services such as education, health or social services, where nationally 
determined policy attempts to ensure uniform standards across the 
country, should remain subject to national funding, even if delivery is 
by LAs acting as agents of national government via central government 
grants. But funding services where there is a deliberate national 
decision to set national standards needs to be strictly separated from 
other local services. 
Recommendation three: Green offsets applied to the APPT 
to improve energy efficiency. 
One solution might be to offer allowances against the house owners’ 
liability for APPT for the more energy efficient houses and an 
additional weighting on the liability for the least energy efficient 
houses. This could be calculated so the net effect of the green offsets 
was broadly revenue neutral.
The existing system of Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) could 
be extended to calculate appropriate offsets. A great advantage of this 
scheme as opposed to previous schemes designed to incentivise more 
energy efficient housing (such as the Green Deal and Green Homes 
Grant) is that there would be no application process, it would provide 
systematic incentives to all house owners, and rates could easily be 
adjusted in the light of progress made towards reducing CO2 emissions 
66. The overarching idea is that the benefits derived from local services and from permitting new 
residential development should be congruent to the costs associated with providing these services 
and permitting the development. See Christian Hilber, Olivier Schöni and Maximilian von Ehrlich, 
“Land use, land use policy and local taxation”, OECD Consultant Report (2016).
LAs should no longer, in effect, be confronted with a revenue penalty if they permit residential 
development. Under the current system this is a very perverse incentive.
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from the residential sector. Since these emissions have been consistently 
rising as a proportion of national CO2 emissions for 30 years, effective 
policy instruments are essential if net zero is to be achieved.
Recommendation four: A Development Levy set at 20% of 
the realised market price of newly constructed houses.
The Development Levy should be charged on the market price of new 
developments. This proposal has similarities with the Infrastructure 
Levy set out in the recent White Paper67 but with both rates and the 
way they are spent required to be uniform across the country and 
determined by national legislation. This would focus the Development 
Levy as proposed here on generating incentives for LAs to accept 
development and ensure the construction social housing now achieved 
via S106 Agreements was more than compensated for and such social 
housing was provided where housing was most expensive. 
Revenues would accrue to LAs but be required to be spent only 
on: infrastructure necessary to support the additional housing while 
maintain service levels; enhanced or additional provision of those public 
services which were the funding responsibility of local government; or 
in each LA a proportion determined by national government of total 
revenues should be spent on additional social or ‘affordable’ housing 
(presently generated via S106 Agreements). 
We recognise such a Development Levy is a second best instrument 
since it is not entirely neutral from the perspective of developers. Even 
though the incidence of the tax would likely ultimately be on the price 
of land, since tax liability would increase with the value of the building 
put on any land, there would be some perverse incentive to build more 
cheaply (to use less capital). It would create winners and losers in the 
development industry, so transition arrangements would be necessary. 
But in a situation in which planning policies have so restricted 
the supply of land that gaining planning permission for a site on the 
67. MHCLG, “Planning for the future”.
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northern edge of London can, for example, increase the value of the 
land from £20,000 per ha to £35,000,000 per ha these defects are all 
but trivial. Since it would be predictable and transparent, it would not 
increase risk or uncertainty, it would eliminate the current substantial 
negotiation costs falling on both LAs and developers and it would 
redress the current imbalance between large developers and smaller 
ones. S106 Agreements represent a substantial fixed cost and are 
one of the factors which have accelerated the monopolisation of the 
development industry. The costs of S106 or CIL are already capitalised 
into land prices meaning that in a range of locations building land has 
a negative price: that is the land is not viable for development. 
While imposing a Development Levy at 20% might just possibly mean 
development in some housing market conditions was not viable, this 
would almost certainly be less than is the case with the present system 
and, since in more prosperous market conditions local communities 
would be transparently compensated for accepting new development, 
the current binding constraint on building or the power of NIMBYism 
would be reduced.
Exploring the distributional implications of our 
reforms by LA and house price
Our main reform is to replace both the CT and SDLT in England with 
an APPT, after an exemption for properties worth less than £50,000 is 
applied. The APPT has two components: a national rate, and a locally 
determined rate. The national rate is designed to replace the revenue 
lost from abolishing SDLT. The local rate will, in practice, be set by LAs.
So far, we have provided an assessment of the APPT against various 
economic and political criteria. However, we have not yet discussed what 
the tax rates might look like and simulated the potential distributional 
impacts – either as revenue per capita or as tax liabilities associated 
with differently priced houses. 
We can conduct a simple before and after analysis at LA-level to simulate 
the potential distributional impacts of our main reform proposal in two 
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ways. First, by showing the proportion of English LAs where a typical 
resident would pay less overall in property tax, and the proportion where 
a typical resident would pay more overall. Second, we can simulate the 
impact on property tax payments before and after our proposed reform 
for a range of representative houses in specific LAs across England. 
Since it is central to our proposed reform that LAs should control 
their own revenues to fund those services that are local responsibilities 
rather than those of national government, it follows that one cannot be 
certain what rate will be applied to the local portion of the APPT. In 
fact, since CT revenues in total are some five times those from SDLT, 
this local tax rate is more important in determining who wins and who 
loses from the reform. 
We have chosen a set of five scenarios that cover a plausible range of 
outcomes from the transition to this new system of property taxation. In 
all cases we apply the same rate of national tax in all LAs such as to make 
up for national government the revenue lost from abolishing the SDLT. 
This means all scenarios have a uniform national element but also a local 
element of revenue which, except in scenario 1), varies by LA. 
The five scenarios are:
1) National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a uniform 
rate across all LAs and yielding in total the same revenue as CT 
does at present.
2) National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a rate in each 
LA so that the local APPT yields the same revenue for each LA as 
CT does at present.
3) National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a rate in each 
LA so that in those LAs where the median house price is greater 
than the overall national median (‘property richer LAs’) the APPT 
is set to yield 10% more revenue than the CT does at present and 
in those in which the median house price is less than the English 
median (‘property poorer LAs’) is set to yield 10% less revenue 
than at present.
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4) National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a rate in 
property richer LAs to yield 20% more revenue and in property 
poorer LAs 20% less revenue than at present.
5) National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a rate in 
property richer LAs to yield 10% less revenue and in property 
poorer LAs 10% more revenue than at present.
The first two of these scenarios aim for overall fiscal neutrality; in 
other words, achieving the same level of revenue from an APPT as from 
SDLT and CT. 
Scenarios 3) and 4) assume that local public goods are normal – 
in other words, richer households, given the choice, consume more 
of them than poorer ones do. This suggests that property richer LAs 
decide to raise their local APPT at a level that raises more revenue than 
under CT, while the converse applies to property poorer LAs. Finally, 
scenario 5) assumes richer households, when they get the chance, 
choose to consume less publicly provided services and instead buy 
more services from the private sector while poorer households desire 
more public services. This reflects the possibility that property richer 
LAs may choose to set local rates at a low level, while property poorer 
LAs set higher local rates. 
Unlike the first two scenarios which are designed to be fiscally 
neutral, it is not possible to estimate the ultimate impact on net tax 
revenues of scenarios 3), 4) and 5) since by intention in these scenarios 
LAs are each charging their own rate of local APPT.
Impact on average property tax liability by local authority
Tax revenue per person essentially illustrates the tax liability of a 
typical resident.68 Calculating the pre-reform annual tax revenues per 
capita at LA-level is fairly straightforward. We have precise data on CT 
68. Since this is the total value of all taxes paid divided by the population in the LA, it is, statistically, 
the mean tax paid.
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revenue by LA from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and we 
can estimate SDLT revenues by LA from the Land Registry. We can 
then calculate separate and combined annual revenues per capita by 
using population estimates from the ONS. We conduct this calculation 
using data for 2019. 
The resulting annual tax revenue per capita by LA are illustrated in 
maps in Figure 5.1 (CT only), Figure 5.2 (SDLT only) and Figure 5.3 
(CT+SDLT) below.
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A visual inspection of the map in Figure 5.1 reveals what for most will 
be a very unexpected fact: the lowest annual per capita revenue from 
the CT tend to be in more central boroughs of Greater London and, to 
a less obvious extent, in the bigger cities. The reverse is true for annual 
SDLT revenue (Figure 5.2 above), of course, since not only are house 
prices more expensive in London and the south east of England, but 
the rate of SDLT rises more than proportionately with price. The result 
is that SDLT – despite its manifold defects – is a highly progressive tax, 
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Figure 5.3. Annual revenue per capita from current main taxes (CT and 
SDLT), by Local Authority 














0 20 40 80 Kilometers
both across houses and regions. But because the SDLT only contributes 
about 18% to the combined revenue of both taxes, the total annual 
revenue by LA is relatively low in the central London boroughs, and 
substantially higher in some LAs in the North East of England.
We can now show the results of scenario 1) – a national APPT to 
replace SDLT revenues and a local APPT to replace CT revenues, set at 
a uniform rate across LAs – in map form to make a visual comparison 
with the pre-reform status quo shown in Figure 5.3 above. This is done 
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in Figure 5.4 further below. 
To calculate both the national and local rate of APPT that would 
be equivalent to the revenue from SDLT and CT in total, we can use 
information on the housing stock by LA from the MHCLG and on 
average house prices by LA from the ONS, both for 2019. Moreover, we 
can use Census data for 2011 to estimate the share of the total housing 
stock that is second homes. 
Again, our scenario 1) stipulates that the national APPT tax rate should 
be set such as to fully replace the SDLT. Our calculations suggest that, on 
average, in England and in 2019 the SDLT revenue per capita is £124 per 
annum. We can then use the housing stock data for 2019, the share of the 
stock that is second homes and the house price data (average between 
2016 and 2018) to derive the national APPT tax rate that generates the 
equivalent annual revenue to the SDLT. This revenue neutral national 
annual tax rate is 0.11% for primary homes and 0.14% for second homes 
(if a 25% surcharge is applied, as suggested earlier in the paper). This 
national APPT rate would apply under all scenarios we simulate. 
Now we can add the local element of APPT on the assumption that all LAs 
set the same local tax rate and this uniform local tax rate generates exactly the 
same revenue nationally as the CT did in 2019. This, again revenue neutral, 
uniform local tax rate is 0.51% for primary homes and 0.63% for second 
homes (if the 25% surcharge on second homes we propose is adopted). 
Combining both the national and local tax rates to achieve scenario 
1), the total, revenue neutral, APPT tax rate is thus 0.62% for primary 
homes (a 0.11% national rate and 0.51% local rate) and 0.77% for 
second homes (a 0.14% national rate and a 0.63% local rate). 
Assuming these tax rates and knowing the value of the housing 
stock in each LA, we can now calculate the implied tax revenue per 
capita of the APPT by LA. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 below, which 
reveals that, under the admittedly somewhat unrealistic assumptions of 
scenario 1) – that local tax rates are uniform across LAs – tax revenue 
per capita would be highest in the Greater London Authority and the 
South East of the country.
74
Home truths














0 20 40 80 Kilometers
* National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a uniform rate across all LAs and yielding in total the same 
revenue as CT does at present, scenario 1).
We can now identify winning LAs and losing LAs of our main reform 
under scenario 1). Winning LAs would be those where the typical 
resident sees a lower expected property tax liability overall. Losing LAs, 
in contrast, would be those where the typical resident sees a higher 
expected property tax liability overall. 
It is worth noting, however, that the labels ‘winning LAs’ and ‘losing 
LAs’ have to be interpreted with some caution since more local tax 
revenue also implies more spending on local public services at local 
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level, benefiting local residents.
To illustrate these winning and losing LAs, we compare the total revenue 
per capita by LA under the current CT and SDLT tax system to that which 
we estimate would be the situation post reform. Since, at present, SDLT is 
only paid when houses are sold, to make this comparison we have converted 
it into an expected annual payment for the mean resident in the way defined 
in Box 5.1. These winning and losing LAs are shown in Figure 5.5 below.
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* National APPT to replace SDLT + local APPT set at a uniform rate across all LAs and yielding in total the same 
revenue as CT does at present, scenario 1).Interestingly, as Figure 5.3 above shows and Table 5.1 below details, 78% 
of all English LAs would see the typical resident face a lower property tax burden post reform and the main losers (in 
the sense of higher local tax burden per capita) would be in Greater London and the South East of the country. 
76
Home truths
However, it is worth reemphasising that, in practice, it is unlikely that 
all LAs would set a uniform APPT local rate as assumed in scenario 
1). Hence, we also consider scenarios 2) to 5) that allow a range of 
alternative local APPT rates. 
There are two ways to illustrate the differential impacts of each 
scenario: we can estimate the proportion of LAs that are winners or 
losers either in absolute terms or weighting each LA by its population. 
The outcomes on this basis are shown in Table 5.1 below.
Table 5.1. Proportion of English LAs where the typical resident has a 
higher (Winning LA) or lower tax burden (Losing LA)
Scenario % ‘Winning’ LAs % ‘Losing’ LAs
1): National APPT*  






2): National APPT  





3): National APPT  
+ property richer LAs  
+10% & property poorer  





4): National APPT  
+ property richer LAs +20%  






5): National APPT  
+ property richer LAs – 10% 






Note: * The national APPT rate is 0.11% for primary homes and 0.14% for second homes. ** The local APPT 
rate is 0.51% for primary homes and 0.63% for second homes. *** The national APPT rate is 0.11% for primary 
homes and 0.14% for second homes. The local APPT rates vary across LAs such as to generate the local CT 
revenue, +/-10% of the local CT revenue, +/-20% of the local CT revenue and – /+10% of the local CT revenue. 
Table 5.1 above shows that different assumptions about local tax rates 
lead to very different outcomes. We see three things. 
First, since the (otherwise heavily flawed) SDLT is even more progressive 
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than the APPT, the national component of the reform is regressive. Thus, if 
we additionally hold local tax revenue constant (so there is no redistribution 
at local level), as in scenario 2), or we assume that poorer (richer) LAs opt 
to set a tax rate that yields more (less) revenue than under CT, as in scenario 
5), the effect of the national component of the reform will dominate and 
thus ultimately yield more losers than winners. 
Second, the ratio of winning to losing LAs can switch quite 
significantly with apparently small changes in local APPT rates. 
Third, whether results are weighted by LA populations or not makes 
little difference to the balance of these LA distributional outcomes.
Overall, however, it is clear that a majority of English LAs would 
see the typical resident have a lower tax liability under our proposed 
system of property taxation relative to the current one in the scenarios 
in which property richer LAs raise more local tax revenue via the APPT 
than under CT and property poorer LAs raise less.
Impact on property tax liability by property price
There is a second and perhaps more revealing way of exploring the 
distributional outcomes of these five scenarios for the proposed 
main reform to English property taxation. This analysis focuses on 
individual houses across representative LAs rather than LA revenue 
per capita, so a different method is used to estimate house-specific CT 
and SDLT liabilities, as described in Box 5.1 below. 
All English LAs can be ranked from the most expensive to the cheapest 
in terms of median house price: Kensington and Chelsea is the most 
expensive, and Burnley the least. These two LAs were selected, therefore, 
and then one LA from each decile in the distribution was selected to 
represent the whole range of the English housing market geography. This 
yielded the ten LAs – from most expensive to least expensive: Chelsea 
and Kensington; Guildford; West Berkshire; Basildon; Bedford; Cheshire 
East; Redditch; Leeds; Newcastle upon Tyne; and, Burnley. 
We show the simulated impact on tax liability of our proposed 
reform for three different types of property across these ten LAs in 
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England. The three different type of property chosen in these ten LAs 
are: a property valued at the median price in an LA as of December 
2019; 50% more than the median; and, 25% less than the median. 
Median prices for each LA relate to December 2019.69 The distribution 
of house prices is not normal: there are relatively few expensive or very 
expensive ones but many less expensive ones. This means that the mean 
of the distribution is higher than the median but that the median is 
more representative of all houses. This is why we have chosen price 
points that are not symmetric with respect to the median. 
Box 5.1. Methodology to ascertain current property-specific CT and 
SDLT liabilities
To enable the comparison of property tax liability between the 
existing and our proposed system by property prices in ten LAs, 
you have to first estimate the property-specific tax liabilities for 
both CT and SDLT in the current system.
On CT, you have to allocate realistic Bands for each of the 30 
representative houses in the ten LAs chosen. This was done searching 
Rightmove and selecting a sample of houses in each LA with asking 
prices at or very close to the given price point. This process was not 
entirely random since outlier-type houses, for example those in very 
poor condition or with a sitting tenant, were discarded. CT Bands 
were then retrieved for some 90 houses. This was done by locating 
the full street address (if not on Rightmove’s details, by inspecting 
photographs which often show street numbers or using Google 
Street View to locate the exact house) and then using the official 
VOA look-up website to identify the CT Band.70
Having established CT Bands for each representative house, the 
69. Median prices for each LA relate to December 2019 as reported in ONS, “Median house prices 
for administrative geographies”.
70. Valuation Office Agency, “Search for your council tax band”, http://cti.voa.gov.uk/cti/InitS.
asp?lcn=0.
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issue then arises as to how best to estimate the local rate that would be 
charged if the APPT were in force that would yield the same revenue 
given the wide variation in observed house prices relative to CT Bands. 
For example, in Bedford, houses with asking prices of £420,000 and 
£280,000 – the median + 50% and the median price for that LA – are in 
the same CT Band, C. The solution adopted is to smooth the effective 
CT rates in terms of current property prices across Bands to estimate 
what APPT rate would have been necessary to have yielded the same 
revenue to the LA as the CT. We know the yield of CT because we 
know the CT Bands and the rate charged by band in Bedford. So we 
apportion that total revenue by current house price so that a given rate 
of tax would yield the currently observed revenue.
This is done for all price bands for each LA. The estimated rate 
can then be adjusted pro rata to give the values needed to produce 
estimates for our other scenarios, for example 10% (or 20%) more 
or less revenue overall from CT. 
Separately, the SDLT payment associated with each of the 30 
representative houses is calculated using the rates applicable during 
2019 for primary homes.71 We then multiply the SDLT tax burden 
for a given transaction in 2019 with the transaction propensity 
for each house to get a predicted annualised value of SDLT tax 
payments associated with each house. We estimate the turnover 
propensity using data on the housing stock in England72 and sales 
numbers73 during 2018-19. 
71. GOV.UK, “Stamp duty land tax”, https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/residential-property-rates.
72. GOV.UK, “Live tables on dwelling stock (including vacants)”, https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-dwelling-stock-including-vacants (2021).





The actual outcome in terms of expected annual tax liability for any 
given property of course depends on what local APPT rate the LA 
actually decided to impose. The five scenarios we have chosen enable 
us to show a range of plausible tax liability outcomes of the proposed 
main reform. 
Table 5.2 below shows, for a house at the three key price points in 
each LA, the change in total annual property tax liability that would 
result from the proposed reform, under the five scenarios chosen for 
differing local APPT rates. 
A negative sign, also in a green background, indicates that less overall 
property tax would be paid after the reform: in essence, that type of 
property in that LA would be a ‘winner’. Conversely, a number in a red 
background shows that this property would be a ‘loser’, in the sense 
they would have a higher tax liability.
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Kensington and Chelsea (top decile)
House value in thousand £ (Council tax band) 1879 (G) 1253 (F) 939 (F)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 7622 4476 3189
Post-reform (win/loss):
  Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 3987 3264 2616
  Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) -3127 -1479 -942
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) -2888 -1320 -822
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) -2649 -1160 -703
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) -3367 -1639 -1062
Guildford (2nd decile)
House value in thousand £ (Council tax band) 651 (F) 434 (C) 326 (C)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 3581 2121 1898
Post-reform (win/loss):
  Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 442 561 113
  Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) -113 191 -164
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 161 373 -28
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 435 556 109
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) -387 8 -301
West Berkshire (3rd decile)
House value in thousand £ (Council tax band) 518 (E) 345 (C) 259 (C)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 2815 1876 1698
Post-reform (win/loss):
  Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 383 256 -99
  Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 218 147 -182
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 464 310 -59
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 709 474 64
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) -27 -17 -304
Basildon (4th decile)
House value in thousand £ (Council tax band) 450 (E) 300 (C) 225 (B)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 2635 1753 1439
Post-reform (win/loss):
  Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 146 101 -48
  Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 188 129 -27
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 420 283 89
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 652 438 205
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) -44 -26 -143
Bedford (5th decile)
House value in thousand £ (Council tax band) 420 (C) 280 (C) 210 (B)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 2030 1742 1453
Post-reform (win/loss):
  Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 566 -12 -155
  Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 744 107 -66
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 954 247 39
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 325 -172 -275
  Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) -140 -9 27
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Cheshire East (6th decile)
House value in thousand £ Sterling (Council tax band) 360 (E) 240 (C) 180 (B)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 2410 1613 1376
Post-reform (win/loss):
 Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) -186 -130 -264
 Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 268 173 -37
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 41 21 -151
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) -187 -131 -264
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) 496 324 77
Redditch (7th decile)
House value in thousand £ Sterling (Council tax band) 326 (D) 218 (C) 163 (A)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 1891 1612 1188
Post-reform (win/loss):
 Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 125 -268 -180
 Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 513 -9 14
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 309 -145 -88
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 105 -281 -189
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) 717 127 116
Leeds (8th decile)
House value in thousand £ Sterling (Council tax band) 277 (D) 185 (B) 139 (A)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 1699 1277 1066
Post-reform (win/loss):
 Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) 15 -134 -209
 Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 391 116 -21
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 213 -2 -110
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 35 -121 -199
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) 569 235 68
Newcastle upon Tyne (9th decile)
House value in thousand £ Sterling (Council tax band) 247 (C) 165 (B) 124 (A)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 1678 1415 1187
Post-reform (win/loss):
 Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) -149 -396 -423
 Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 513 45 -92
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 322 -82 -188
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 130 -210 -283
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) 704 173 4
Burnley (bottom decile)
House value in thousand £ Sterling (Council tax band) 141 (B) 94 (A) 71 (A)
Pre-reform tax (SDLT+CT, in £) 1445 1230 1230
Post-reform (win/loss):
 Nat. APPT + local APPT w. uniform tax rate (in £) -574 -649 -795
 Nat. APPT + keep local CT revenue constant (in £) 509 73 -253
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 10% (in £) 329 -47 -343
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. +/- 20% (in £) 150 -167 -433
 Nat. APPT + CT rev. – /+ 10% (in £) 689 192 -163
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Thus, as can be seen in Table 5.2 above, in the lowest priced housing 
market, Burnley, the cheapest houses are winners in all scenarios and 
houses with a price at the market median also gain in all scenarios, 
except those in which LA revenue is kept constant (scenario 2) or 
where we assume property rich LAs reduce their taxation by 10% and 
property poor LAs increase it by 10% (scenario 5).
Overall, there is a pattern of more winners in poorer LAs and for less 
expensive houses. Combining the results of all the different scenarios, 
of the lowest priced houses in the ten representative LAs, 76% are 
winners; for the median priced houses, 48% are winners; and, for the 
most expensive houses only 24% are winners. When interpreting these 
results, it is worth bearing in mind that there tends to be relatively few 
expensive (50% more than the median price) homes in a given LA, and 
many less expensive (25% less than the median price) ones.
As should be expected, the property poor LAs only tend to be losers 
in scenario 5) in which they are assumed to increase their local APPT 
rates while they are reduced in the property rich LAs. In the general 
pattern of property poorer and cheaper houses tending to be winners, 
the stand-out exception is Kensington and Chelsea. Here house prices 
are so high that almost none of the assumed local APPT rates under the 
different scenarios offsets the abolition of the highly progressive SDLT. 
The only scenario in which all house price points lose in Kensington 
and Chelsea is when the local APPT is set at a uniform rate across 
the country: expensive in an LA where the median house price was 
£1,253,000.
As we have stressed, the distributional effects of a single tax are only 
one factor in assessing its benefits. From a distributional viewpoint what 
matters is the overall effect of the tax system as a whole and also of the 
welfare system. Here we focus just on the distributional impacts of our 
proposed reforms to the main elements of English property taxation. 
And even just in this narrow focus they bear up quite promisingly. 
Looking at the combined effect of our reforms, our simulations show 
that in any scenario in which property richer LAs increase their tax 
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rates relative to property poorer ones, then there are more residents 
who on average pay less in property tax than they do now, as Table 5.1 
further above illustrates. Perhaps more telling, however, are the results 
of Table 5.2, which suggest that a move to APPT tends to favour lower-
value properties, which will pay less property tax than the current 
system, particularly in property poor English LAs such as Burnley, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne or Leeds. An APPT has a clear potential role, 
therefore, both in delivering the Government’s ‘levelling up’ agenda 
and in ending the unfairness of the property tax system.
Conclusion
When starting the work for this report the authors were well aware 
of how problematic the main forms of taxation were: CT; SDLT; S106 
Agreements and the CIL. But as the work progressed it became apparent 
the problems were even more serious than anticipated because the flaws 
in each element of the system reinforce those in others.
The existing system of property taxation in England is seriously flawed. 
But these taxes exist in an institutional environment which is itself 
dysfunctional. Local government finance is a complex tangle of user 
charges, property tax revenues and central government grants. There 
is a fuzzy division of responsibilities between central and subnational 
government (and there are a tangle of different layers): sometimes 
subnational governments act as agents of national government with 
almost no discretion; sometimes the responsibility is primarily that of 
local government. And, unfortunately, one of the areas over which local 
governments have most control is our highly dysfunctional planning 
system which in turn determines the supply of housing. This creates a 
vicious circle in which a dysfunctional fiscal system combined with a 
failing system of property taxation work in tandem to generate harmful 
unintended incentives, even more damaging than the individual 
components would be in isolation. In turn these unintended incentives 
interact with a dysfunctional system of land use regulation to fuel 
NIMBYism.
A new system for taxing residential property in England
85
Thus, any reform proposed for English property taxation has to accept 
it will be applied in at least a third best world and, on their own, better 
property taxes cannot solve all problems. We have to accept second best 
solutions. We also have to confront existing fudges to decide whether 
it is property taxes that are being reformed, local government finances 
or the division of powers between tiers of government, because they 
are all interdependent. Here, we have taken the view that there can 
be no serious degree of autonomy unless local government has some 
control over its revenues independently of national government. With 
no resources, there can be no autonomy. 
We have embedded this in the simplest, admittedly imperfect, set of 
reforms that seem feasible. With these reforms, we have aimed to strike 
a balance between what is economically efficient yet also politically 
feasible. Moving to an APPT fulfils both of these criteria, as well as 
having a role to play in addressing regional inequalities. With the 
addition of green offsets and a Developer Levy, these reforms will result 
in a system of property taxation that is fairer, greener, helps deliver 
more new homes and is simpler and more transparent than the one we 
have now.

